A received OKF bundle MAY legitimately carry index.md (directory listing, read
first under progressive disclosure) and log.md (update history) at any level
(spec §3.1/§6/§7). import_bundle previously hard-rejected those basenames in the
T4 path gate, so a conformant third-party bundle was over-blocked in full
(FAIL_SECURE) — and because the reject fired before scan_concept, index.md's
body (the highest-priority injection surface) was never scanned.
import_bundle now defaults allow_reserved=True: reserved basenames are scanned
as structural files (path-safety checks — traversal / absolute / backslash / .md
— still apply). The shadow-reject (an *upload* masquerading as index.md) is
preserved: the front-end passes allow_reserved=False so a materialized upload
landing on a reserved basename is still refused. That front-end opt-in was
required to keep the shadow-reject once the default flipped (not in the plan's
Filer set; traced from the code).
- okf.py: validate_concept_path/_validate_concept/import_bundle gain the
keyword; validate_concept_path default stays False (strict standalone).
- tests: +3 (legit index/log admit; injection in index.md body caught;
okf_version frontmatter admits). Per-concept-iteration test switched to a
traversal vector; mode-b showcase's index.md surface reframed from
reserved-name-reject to index.md-body-scan.
- README honest-limits + CLAUDE.md context note the mode-b/upload distinction.
Suite: 341 -> 344 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
Close the EchoLeak wiring hole (CVE-2025-32711 class): markdown images/
links, reference definitions, autolinks, raw active HTML and data: URIs
now surface as report-only findings (active:*, OWASP LLM05) in
scan_output step 6, so screen_output and okf.import_bundle dispose of
them instead of admitting them with findings=[].
- new active_content.py: canonical home of the shared pattern table +
scan_active_content; neutralize refactored to import it (mutating API
and behavior unchanged, all neutralize tests pass as-is)
- images/links flagged only for absolute/protocol-relative URLs:
relative in-bundle links are legitimate wiki/OKF mechanism (principle 5)
- evidence carries defanged URLs only (hxxps://evil[.]example)
- EchoLeak vectors planted in both showcases; detach proofs cover them
- README export list + checklist step 6, CLAUDE.md context line updated
Suite: 321 -> 341 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
The OKF analogue of tests/test_showcase.py: one received external bundle plants
one attack per OKF surface (T1 body + frontmatter-description, T3 non-https
resource, T4 path-traversal + reserved-name, T2 dangerous frontmatter value,
T5a dangerous-scheme link, §7.2 dangling link, homoglyph-obfuscated body) run
through the public okf surface as an upload-inbox consumer would compose it.
Aggregate fails secure -> REJECT; a clean bundle admits (WARN); the log marks
rejected concepts. Detach-proof: an always-admit gate catches none of the
surfaces, so the assertions have teeth. Stream-2 centrepiece (PLAN §212);
Stage-1 realistic upload extraction (§247) is the next increment.
Tests 277 -> 282.
