Commit graph

2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
4d53765c63 feat(guard): active-content detector wired into the output gate (review MAJOR #1)
Close the EchoLeak wiring hole (CVE-2025-32711 class): markdown images/
links, reference definitions, autolinks, raw active HTML and data: URIs
now surface as report-only findings (active:*, OWASP LLM05) in
scan_output step 6, so screen_output and okf.import_bundle dispose of
them instead of admitting them with findings=[].

- new active_content.py: canonical home of the shared pattern table +
  scan_active_content; neutralize refactored to import it (mutating API
  and behavior unchanged, all neutralize tests pass as-is)
- images/links flagged only for absolute/protocol-relative URLs:
  relative in-bundle links are legitimate wiki/OKF mechanism (principle 5)
- evidence carries defanged URLs only (hxxps://evil[.]example)
- EchoLeak vectors planted in both showcases; detach proofs cover them
- README export list + checklist step 6, CLAUDE.md context line updated

Suite: 321 -> 341 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
2026-07-15 06:11:33 +02:00
a44cf3c7b7 test(showcase): end-to-end multi-vuln pipeline + adversarial/FP corpora (recall)
Module 11's final deliverable (BRIEF §9, PLAN §132), built last. Exercises the
full public toolkit as a consumer would compose it — the _ingest helper doubles
as the README worked example.

- test_showcase: ONE poisoned artifact planting a vulnerability per detection
  channel — 5 invisible carriers (zero-width/BIDI/unicode-tag/html-comment/
  data-uri), injection across raw + homoglyph + rot13 + whole-string-base64
  (decode-and-rescan) channels with DISTINCT lexicon ids so dedup won't merge
  them, plus a credential the mock transform leaks into its output (LLM02). All
  10 planted labels caught; disposition FAIL_SECURE; egress evidence never
  carries the secret value; a clean document + clean transform WARNs (no FP).
- test_corpus: adversarial recall == 100% over the planted classes (a silent
  drop is a regression), and a false-positive corpus of attack-resembling legit
  content (injection vocabulary, secret-shaped placeholders/varrefs, high-entropy
  checksums) that disposes WARN under a trusted source — most producing NO
  finding (the suppression rules hold). One MEDIUM homoglyph case proves hard-fail
  is an explicit opt-in: same finding WARNs trusted, QUARANTINEs under upload.

Secret fixtures assembled from fragments (gitleaks-safe); every payload verified
against the real detectors before assertion. 12 new tests; 201 green total.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HyRCQMocjZ6SmSQ6JidJ2k
2026-07-04 23:34:51 +02:00