Kjell Tore Guttormsen
0bf07295c2
The per-repo gate flagged four ERRORs and two WARNs. Fixed, in the order the work actually gets done in: MISSING - `## Honest limitations` -> `## Known limitations`, `## Out-of-scope (documented boundary)` -> `## Non-goals`. Both sections existed under names no reader or agent scans for; the contract wants predictable top-level headings. Pointers followed: the in-README anchor, SECURITY.md's out-of-scope preamble, CONTRIBUTING.md's scope section, and the consumer-facing docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md. Historical records (CHANGELOG, docs/PLAN.md, docs/OKF-INGESTION-BRIEF.md) keep the name they were written with. WEAKENING - README now opens with one line identical to the forge description, above the badges. That is the only place a machine can check description == README. - Forge description shortened 207 -> 178 codepoints (bound 180), and the same string written to pyproject's `description` so the fourth copy cannot drift. The tests badge is dropped, not updated. `tests-699_passing` as a static image is a claim dressed as evidence: there is no CI runner on this forge, so nothing verifies it. Replaced with the honest substitute in Install — the single command that runs the suite from a clean clone, stated together with the fact that nothing runs it automatically. Two WARNs deliberately left standing: - H1 `# llm-ingestion-guard` != repo name. The register itself records llm-ingestion-guard as "a package, not a repo"; the H1 names what you pip install. Renaming the repo is the operator's call, not this commit's. - The `Status` badge trips the same claim-badge regex, but `alpha` asserts maturity, not a run — the same reason version/license/platform are exempt. Measured false positive in the gate's classifier, reported upstream.
62 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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`llm-ingestion-guard` is a defensive library for LLM ingestion pipelines. Its own
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security posture matters: a flaw here can silently admit a poisoned artifact into a
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downstream corpus. Reports are welcome.
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## Supported versions
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The project is pre-1.0 (`0.2.x`, alpha). Only the latest published version receives
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fixes; there are no back-ported security branches yet. Pin a version and watch the
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`CHANGELOG.md` `### Security` entries.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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**Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.** Public disclosure before a fix
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gives an attacker a window against every downstream consumer.
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Instead, report it **privately** to the maintainer via the canonical repository on
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Forgejo:
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- Repository: `git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security`
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- Contact the maintainer directly through that Forgejo instance (private message /
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maintainer contact) and mark the subject `SECURITY`.
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Please include:
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- affected version / commit,
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- a minimal reproduction (input → observed disposition/finding vs. expected),
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- the impact you see (e.g. a poisoned artifact that disposes `WARN` instead of
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`FAIL_SECURE`).
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Obfuscate any real payloads the same way the test corpus does — build attack strings
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from `chr(0x…)` fragments so the report itself does not ship a live carrier.
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## What counts as a vulnerability
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In scope (a real finding):
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- a bypass of a **stated** control — e.g. an invisible carrier that reaches the
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persist gate without failing secure, a credential that egresses without a
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`decoded:egress:*` / `egress:*` label, a `guard()` path that fails *open*;
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- a `prepare_input` / `screen_output` code path that raises instead of failing
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closed;
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- a ReDoS or unbounded-resource input against the scanner.
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Out of scope (documented boundaries — see the **Known limitations** section of
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`README.md`, not vulnerabilities):
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- semantic / factual poisoning invisible to lexicon + entropy;
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- a HIGH finding in *trusted* prose disposing to `WARN` (§4.7 trust-scaling);
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- hex-wrapped (non-base64) secret egress;
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- multimodal / binary-layer carriers (OCR, font stego, VBA/macros, encrypted files);
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- the multilingual homoglyph-mix false positive.
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If you are unsure whether something is in scope, report it privately anyway.
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## Disclosure
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This is a small project without a formal embargo SLA. The maintainer will
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acknowledge a report, agree a fix + disclosure timeline with the reporter, and
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credit the reporter in the `CHANGELOG.md` `### Security` entry unless they prefer to
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remain anonymous.
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