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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
c362717818 fix(security): use security@ as the reporting contact, not hello@
hello@ works, but two different addresses across sibling org repos
force a reporter finding a vulnerability to guess which one is the
security channel. security@fromaitochitta.com is the designated one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fm8ErxAacrm5s8ZWWubgMP
2026-08-21 11:22:58 +02:00
f0a511369d fix(spec): section 7 stated its own premise and then applied itself beyond it
Section 7 justified the fixture-is-ground-truth ordering with "Two
implementations that return different verdicts" and then stated the rule
with no scope. For signatures/active-content.json there is no second
implementation, and the seed runtime has stated the classification behind
it is calibration it does not freeze. As written, section 7 turned a change
they reserved into a bug on their side.

New section 7.1 keys the scope on a structural property, never on a table
name: a scope only one runtime implements, whose payload that runtime
authored. It creates no fourth verdict - the declaration schema closes
result with additionalProperties:false over four counts, so a fifth would
break every consumer's parser. The case still fails and is still named in
failed_cases; what changes is what the failure licenses concluding.

Two limits are stated rather than left to inference: it does not reach a
third-party implementer of the same table, and it is not a licence for a
runtime to self-declare its own divergence as calibration.

manifest.json 0.6.1 -> 0.6.2 retires the open-question sentence, quoted
rather than dropped. The retirement is partial: "section 7 is NOT amended
by this block" stays true, because the spec was amended by its own release.

Neighbours measured over the whole repository, widened past "ground truth"
to the second paragraph's own wording. CONVENTIONS.md and CLAUDE.md carried
the premise and are changed; SECURITY.md gets a cross-reference only, since
its claim is about a fixture expecting too little and 7.1 does not narrow
that direction; README.md and docs/extraction-plan.md are named as
deliberately untouched.

Breaking in category, minor in number - 0.x, per the reading [0.3.0]
recorded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012pZ2FLQ6xkWvj2VcwgwnQv
2026-08-13 23:31:28 +02:00
0e765a02eb docs(security): the attack surface here is data, so the report route had to say where a wrong entry gets fixed
org-ops recorded SECURITY.md as missing against the org standard (coord,
2026-08-11) and this repository owed it for a sharper reason than "given what
the repo is about": nothing here runs, so a report is never a crash — it is a
detection entry that looks like it works and is not looking.

SECURITY.md therefore answers what an ordinary policy does not have to: how to
report that a detection-table entry is WRONG, and why a confirmed defect in
extracted data is decided in the runtime it was extracted from before it is
changed here. Correcting it here would make the copy disagree with the
implementation it was taken from — two runtimes, two answers on one input, the
exact failure this repository exists to prevent. Two classes skip that routing:
a real secret in the history, and data authored here rather than extracted.
Fix latency is stated plainly as bounded by the owning runtime's schedule and
the consumer's pull, not by ours.

secret-egress 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0 is a staleness DISCLOSURE, not a data change: all
18 patterns byte-identical, one evidence_limits entry added. llm-security
reports the source table at 19 entries now; recorded as their report and not
reproduced, because the commit carrying it is not on their public remote —
measured at b1ba1fb today. What was measured here: none of the 18 patterns
matches a legacy sk-...T3BlbkFJ... shape. A consumer vendoring this file
under-matches the seed hook by one entry, and now reads that in the file.

manifest 0.3.0 -> 0.3.1 corrects the secret-egress blocker. Through 0.3.0 it
named gcp-service-account-json and openai-api-key-legacy together as ids
"absent here". Measured against the guard at e671edb by running this file's own
18 patterns over a service-account document: a COMPLETE service-account key
file is matched here at order 11, since the PEM entry's prefix group is
optional and the bare PKCS#8 header matches; the same document with private_key
removed matches nothing here while the guard's marker still fires. That is a
cut-point difference, which is what the blocker is about, not a missing entry.
openai-api-key-legacy IS a real hole and is now recorded as one. Folded into
the existing blocker string rather than a sibling key, because blockers is a
map from table path to text.

Verified: all JSON well-formed; every non-fixture JSON has a top-level version;
charter clean (no executable code); patterns[] and count byte-identical to HEAD
for secret-egress; manifest key set unchanged and count still 90; 90 case
directories untouched; every spec still carries its normative marker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T85QqeiWBEoBMjWaMiBnxD
2026-08-11 14:03:24 +02:00