Kjell Tore Guttormsen
23cf3e383a
The four prompt-injection pattern families — 21 critical, 32 high, 22 medium, 8 hybrid — with per-pattern label, ECMAScript source and declared flags. Data only. The dump names checkCognitiveLoadTrap and scanForInjection's variant building (normalise → fold → rot13 → unicode-tag escalation) as ENGINE logic that never moves here; they are absent by intent, not omission. Proven, not transcribed: all four arrays were rebuilt from the commons JSON alone and diffed against the imported dump module — 83/83 identical on label, source and flags, 81 of them byte-identical. All 83 compile in Node bare, Node under `u`, and Python `re`. Two deliberate deviations from byte-identity, declared in the file: the zero-width and Cyrillic character classes carried raw code points, four of them invisible. Escaped to \uXXXX (the convention forbids raw invisible code points outside conformance inputs — an unreviewable class is where a silent false negative hides) and proven equivalent by differential match-set comparison over 208 adversarial inputs, 832 comparisons, 0 differences. Class membership was counted from the dump bytes: the zero-width class holds 4 code points and does NOT include U+00AD. HYBRID_PATTERNS' severity was not supplied and is left null rather than inferred from its siblings. Verification log in docs/extraction-plan.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FaYqid3mejFmd9ZHsiHgp3
146 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
146 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Extraction plan — v0.1.0
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**Status: informative.** This is the plan of record for how this repository came to exist,
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copied verbatim (structure preserved, lightly reformatted) from the operator brief that
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opened it. It is **not** normative: nothing here constrains a consumer. When it disagrees
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with `spec/` or `schema/`, those win.
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Origin: **Phase 4 of the `llm-security` v8 plan**, which lives in the sibling repository
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`llm-security`. That repository is context only — no session in this repository reads from
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or writes to it.
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## Charter
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No engine code. Only: JSON data, normative specs, and a conformance corpus that several
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runtimes (Node in `llm-security`, Python in a guard repo, a wiki) can run against and get
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an identical verdict from. The pattern is copied from the sibling repository
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`portfolio-optimiser-commons` (hard charter: "nothing here may import/depend on a
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framework").
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## Layout
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```
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llm-security-commons/
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README.md # charter: data+contract+fixtures only, no engine code
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lexicon/injection-lexicon.json
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codepoints/carriers.json # zero-width, BIDI, Unicode-Tag ranges, homoglyph map
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signatures/secret-egress.json
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signatures/malware-signatures.json
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signatures/active-content.json # EchoLeak: MD image/link/refdef/autolink, data:, active HTML
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calibration/calibration.json # entropy floors, scan caps, disposition ranks
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mapping/owasp-map.json # prefix -> LLM/ASI/AST/MCP
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schema/finding.schema.json # + SARIF & JSONL profiles. Status: normative
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spec/decode-pipeline.md # normative RFC-2119 decode order
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conformance/ # {case}/input.txt + {case}/expected.json
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STATE.md # LOCAL-ONLY / gitignored (mirror commons convention)
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```
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Every JSON file carries a top-level `"version"` field. Every spec carries a
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`Status: normative` marker.
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## v0.1.0 seed sources
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`llm-security` is the canonical and richest source. **This repository's sessions have no
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read access to it** — content arrives only as an operator-supplied dump. Security-critical
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tables (homoglyph map, secret patterns, malware signatures) MUST come from real source
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data, never from recollection or inference.
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| Target | Seed source in `llm-security` (unless noted) |
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|---|---|
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| `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` | `scanners/lib/injection-patterns.mjs` |
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| `codepoints/carriers.json` | `scanners/unicode-scanner.mjs` + `scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs` (incl. `HOMOGLYPH_MAP`) |
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| `signatures/secret-egress.json` | `knowledge/secrets-patterns.md` — the **18-entry hook table**, NOT the PCRE-flavored agent-consumed variant |
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| `signatures/malware-signatures.json` | `knowledge/signatures.json` (the SIG scanner) |
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| `signatures/active-content.json` | currently only in a guard repo's `active_content.py`. If unavailable: stub with a version field and a TODO naming the source |
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| `calibration/calibration.json` | `scanners/lib/severity.mjs` — thresholds + scanner caps |
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| `mapping/owasp-map.json` | `scanners/lib/severity.mjs` — `OWASP_MAP` (+ 3 sibling maps in the same file) |
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| `schema/finding.schema.json` | modelled on `scanners/lib/sarif-formatter.mjs`'s SARIF shape |
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| `conformance/` | union of the guard repo's `coverage.py` matrix (126 classes + 4 gaps-must-hold) and `llm-security/examples/` |
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## Constraints
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- Offline / deterministic only — no network, no model calls inside the data itself.
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- Forgejo `open/` — never GitHub.
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- MIT license, fork-and-own.
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- `STATE.md` is LOCAL-ONLY (gitignored) — same convention as the rest of the polyrepo.
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- **Behaviour preservation is the point:** this must not change a single finding in
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`llm-security` when it is later consumed from here. That consumption happens in
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`llm-security`'s own Phase 5 steps 3–4 — **not here.**
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## Verification log
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Every claim of fidelity below was produced by a command, not by reading. The check scripts
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themselves deliberately do **not** live in this repository — executable code here would
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breach the charter. They are reproducible from the description given.
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### `signatures/active-content.json` — extracted 2026-08-09
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Source: `llm-ingestion-pipeline-security` v0.3.4, commit `0bf0729` (2026-08-03),
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`src/llm_ingestion_guard/active_content.py` + `calibration.py`. Read-only; nothing in that
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repository was modified.
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| Check | Method | Result |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| JSON well-formed | `python3 -m json.tool` | pass |
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| Patterns compile as Python `re` | translate `(?<` → `(?P<`, compile all 17 with declared flags | 17/17, 0 failures |
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| Patterns compile as ECMAScript | `new RegExp(pattern, flags)` on all 17 | 17/17, 0 failures |
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| Pattern text matches source | compare against the live `re.Pattern.pattern` of each source object, inline flags stripped | 12/17 byte-identical; 5 differ only by the documented `redundant-quote-escape` normalisation |
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| The 5 normalised patterns behave identically | differential match-set comparison (offsets + captured text) against the source objects over a 30-input adversarial corpus: bare quotes, escaped quotes, markdown titles containing quotes, quoted/unquoted HTML attributes, quote runs of length 1–5 | 150 comparisons, 0 differences |
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| The normalisation is necessary | `new RegExp('\\"', 'u')` and `'v'` in Node | both throw `Invalid escape`; the bare form compiles under `""`, `"u"` and `"v"` |
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| Severities, ordinary severity, opacity floors, active-tag set, pass order | compare against `calibration.ACTIVE_CONTENT_SEVERITY`, `ACTIVE_CONTENT_ORDINARY_SEVERITY`, `URL_OPAQUE_*`, `active_content._ACTIVE_TAGS`, and the scan-call order in `scan_active_content` | all identical (23/23 tags, 6/6 severities, 4/4 floors) |
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Not verified, and not claimed: that the Node consumer's active-content behaviour matches
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this table. The source module states the Node port shares its severities; that is the
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module's claim, and confirming it needs the Node file.
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### `schema/finding.schema.json` — extracted 2026-08-09
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Source: `llm-security/scanners/lib/sarif-formatter.mjs`, supplied as an operator dump. No
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commit hash accompanied it, so provenance is recorded as `unknown` rather than guessed.
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| Check | Method | Result |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| JSON well-formed | `python3 -m json.tool` | pass |
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| Valid JSON Schema | `jsonschema` `check_schema` against draft 2020-12 | pass |
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| Accepts/rejects findings correctly | 2 valid + 3 invalid findings (missing `scanner`, unknown severity, `line: 0`) | 5/5 as intended |
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| SARIF profile reproduces the source | re-implemented the mapping **from the commons JSON alone** and diffed `JSON.stringify` against the real `toSARIF` over 10 envelope shapes: empty, missing `scanners`, empty `scanners`, scanner with no findings, all five severities plus an unknown and an `undefined` one, five slug edge cases (double space, tab, newline, leading/trailing space, mixed case), a rule-id collision, all seven optional-field combinations, two scanners, and an explicit `version` argument | 10/10 identical, 0 differences |
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| The three `known_lossiness` claims are true | executed each against the real formatter | all three confirmed, **and one earlier claim corrected**: punctuation does *not* collapse — the slug lowercases and collapses whitespace only, so `Zero-width carrier` and `Zero-width carrier!` remain distinct ids. The wrong claim was published in the first draft of this file and fixed before commit. |
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Not verified, and recorded in the file as open: the finding **producer** was not supplied, so
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the property list is a lower bound; `scanner` and `severity` are required by design rather
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than by evidence; and the JSONL profile is left explicitly `unspecified` rather than
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invented, because "one finding per line" is inference.
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### `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` — extracted 2026-08-09
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Source: `llm-security/scanners/lib/injection-patterns.mjs`, supplied as operator dump 2/2
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through the local coord mailbox. No commit hash accompanied it, so provenance is recorded
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as `unknown` rather than guessed.
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| Check | Method | Result |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| JSON well-formed, `version` present, LF, trailing newline, no raw invisible code points | `python3 -m json.tool` + a byte scan for U+200B/200C/200D/FEFF/00AD and the Tag block | pass, 0 raw invisible code points |
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| Pattern text and flags reproduce the source | rebuilt all four arrays **from the commons JSON alone** (`new RegExp(p.pattern, p.flags ?? '')`) and diffed label, `.source` and `.flags` against the imported dump module | 83/83 compared, 0 differences; 81/83 byte-identical, 2 declared-normalised |
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| Flags were read mechanically, not by eye | extracted from each literal via `.flags` | critical 15×`i` / 3×`m` / 3 none, high 32×`i`, medium 20×`i` / 2 none, hybrid 8×`i` |
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| Every pattern compiles in both runtimes | `new RegExp(src, flags)` and again with `u` in Node; `re.compile` with the equivalent `re.I`/`re.M` in Python | 83/83 in all three modes, 0 failures |
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| The 2 normalised patterns behave identically | differential match-set comparison (offsets + matched text) against the source objects, bare and under `u`, over a 208-input adversarial corpus: every class member, the near-misses excluded from each class (U+00AD, U+2060, U+180E, Cyrillic х, the uppercase set, Greek look-alikes), run boundaries, repeats, empty input | 832 comparisons, 0 differences |
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| Class membership was counted, not assumed | enumerated the code points inside each character class directly from the dump bytes | zero-width class = 4 (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF — **not** U+00AD); Cyrillic class = 7 (U+0430, U+0435, U+043E, U+0440, U+0441, U+0456, U+0443) |
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| `\/` is portable, not a defect | 9 patterns carry the redundant escape a JS regex literal requires; compiled in Node bare, Node `u`, and Python `re` | accepted by all three — kept byte-identical, recorded as a translation note for engines that reject unknown escapes |
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Not verified, and not claimed: that the dump matches the module it was transcribed from.
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Every check above proves this JSON agrees with **the dump**; dump-to-module fidelity is
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`llm-security`'s assertion, reproducible only in a session with read access to that
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repository. The severity the engine assigns to `HYBRID_PATTERNS` was not supplied and is
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left `null` rather than inferred from its three sibling arrays.
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## Definition of done for v0.1.0
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1. Repository initialized, Forgejo remote `open/llm-security-commons`, MIT, `STATE.md`
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gitignored.
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2. Every file in the layout above present and populated from verified seed data — or
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explicitly and visibly stubbed where the source was unavailable.
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3. All JSON well-formed, every data file carrying `"version"`, every spec carrying
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`Status: normative`.
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4. Tagged `v0.1.0` and pushed.
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5. A `coord` message sent to `llm-security` announcing that the repository and `v0.1.0`
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exist, so Phase 5 step 3 (vendoring) can start from there.
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