Advisor review found six gaps the session's own checks did not cover. The one
that mattered was outward-facing: the divergence report told the guard repo
that two sub-agent bounds were undocumented. That was wrong. lexicon.py's
module docstring documents them explicitly under "Bounded token gaps", and
git log -S dates {0,12} to the original port commit f397cd9 and [^><] to the
ReDoS fix cff0437. Every divergence on the guard's side is documented and
traceable. The claim rested on two sed slices of one file; an absence claim
needs a search over the whole repository. Corrected here and by coord.
lexicon/injection-lexicon.json 0.2.0 -> 0.3.0:
- pattern_id_space.alias_evidence records the two aliases separately instead
of averaging them. llm_ingestion_guard is verified — coverage.py asserts on
that exact string, so it is demonstrably what a guard finding carries.
llm_security is not: it is the pattern table's name, the finding producer
was never supplied, and the known Node finding shape uses title, not label.
- normalisations[].affects now keys on id, with the prose names kept beside it
as affects_labels. An internal cross-reference on label was a second
identity space inside the file the id exists to unify.
Detection data unmoved again: labels, patterns, flags and the ids and aliases
added in 7b70f5b are all byte-identical in sequence; 166/166 Node compiles.
Also: the README lexicon row described thematic families the file does not
have (they are severity families; the theme is the id prefix), and the
conformance convertibility table gained its missing second condition — a case
is buildable only if the label it asserts maps to data this repository
publishes. Eleven cases fail that test (entropy, decoded, the sanitize rows,
the OKF scans), so the buildable set is ~94, not 105.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FaYqid3mejFmd9ZHsiHgp3
5.5 KiB
Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.
Versioning note: the repository tag versions the contract (file set, key names,
case ids, disposition semantics). Each JSON file additionally carries its own
"version" field, bumped when that file changes.
[Unreleased]
Initial extraction, in progress. Runtime-neutral detection data and the finding contract,
extracted from the llm-security Node implementation and a Python guard without behaviour
change. Not yet tagged — see Not included below.
Added
schema/finding.schema.json— the finding contract plus the SARIF output profile. Normative. The JSONL profile is deliberately leftunspecified.signatures/active-content.json— the EchoLeak class (CVE-2025-32711): 17 patterns, severities, opacity floors and pass order, from the Python guard.lexicon/injection-lexicon.json— 83 prompt-injection patterns in four families (21 critical, 32 high, 22 medium, 8 hybrid).codepoints/carriers.json— six carrier tables: zero-width characters, the Unicode Tags block, the Supplementary Private Use Areas, BIDI controls, the Cyrillic presence set and the 28-entry fold-to-Latin homoglyph map.signatures/secret-egress.json— the 18 fixed credential and token shapes. Array order is normative.mapping/owasp-map.json— four taxonomy maps (LLM, ASI, AST, MCP) over one shared 16-prefix key set.calibration/calibration.json— risk-score tier constants, verdict thresholds, risk-band cutoffs, posture grade thresholds.
Verification
Every file above except calibration.json was proven rather than transcribed: the data was
rebuilt from the commons JSON alone and diffed against the source implementation. Each
file records its own result and its own limits.
calibration/calibration.json carries verified: false. Its source arrived as a prose
summary rather than as code, so no differential check was possible, and the file names the
checks that were not run instead of attaching a caveat to a pass.
docs/lexicon-port-divergence.md— informative. A differential comparison of the two ports ofinjection-patterns.mjs(this repository's and the Python guard's): 83/83 patterns correspond, 64 are byte-identical, 6 differ only by escaping and are proven equivalent, and 13 behave differently, with a witness input for each and misses on both sides. The cause is two different ReDoS mitigations of one table. No data file was changed — behaviour preservation holds and the finding is reported to the owning repositories.
Changed
-
lexicon/injection-lexicon.json0.2.0 → 0.3.0 — the two aliases are no longer presented as equally backed.pattern_id_space.alias_evidencenow records each one separately:llm_ingestion_guardis verified (the guard's coverage matrix asserts on that exact string, so it is demonstrably what a guard finding carries), whilellm_securityis not — it is the pattern table's own name, and the finding producer was never supplied, with the known Node finding shape usingtitlerather thanlabel. Averaging the two into one file-level claim would have repeated the defect this repository corrects per-table elsewhere.Also:
normalisations[].affectsnow keys onidwith the prose names kept beside it asaffects_labels. An internal cross-reference on label was a second identity space inside the file the id was added to unify. -
lexicon/injection-lexicon.json0.1.0 → 0.2.0 — every pattern gains a commons-ownedidand analiasesobject naming what each seeding runtime calls it, plus a top-levelpattern_id_spaceblock explaining the field. This exists because aconformance/fixture has to name a finding and the two runtimes do not name the same pattern the same way.The id was adopted verbatim from the guard's port, which already carried both names, rather than invented here. Matching was by
label↔descwith em-dash normalised to hyphen: 83/83, one-to-one, ids unique.No detection data moved. Labels, patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence, no
flagskey was invented (78 before, 78 after), and stripping the three new fields reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte — 23 566 bytes, identical. All 83 patterns still compile in Node bare and underu(166/166) and in Pythonre(83/83).Neither
llm-securitynor the guard has ratified this id space yet; both were asked by coord on 2026-08-09, and the file says so rather than implying agreement.
Not included
signatures/malware-signatures.json— seed data not yet delivered.spec/decode-pipeline.md— needs the decode implementation. A normative spec inferred from a data dump would be worse than an absent one.conformance/— still absent, with half the blocker cleared. 105 of the guard's 134 coverage cases are convertible to staticinput.txt/expected.json; the other 29 assert a runtime's API surface, which this repository does not own. Findings can now be named (seepattern_id_spaceabove), but 13 patterns still have no agreed expected behaviour — the two ports genuinely differ on them — so those fixtures cannot be authored until the owning repositories answer.
These are named in the README as planned rather than linked, so nothing in the repository points at a file that does not exist.