Advisor review found six gaps the session's own checks did not cover. The one
that mattered was outward-facing: the divergence report told the guard repo
that two sub-agent bounds were undocumented. That was wrong. lexicon.py's
module docstring documents them explicitly under "Bounded token gaps", and
git log -S dates {0,12} to the original port commit f397cd9 and [^><] to the
ReDoS fix cff0437. Every divergence on the guard's side is documented and
traceable. The claim rested on two sed slices of one file; an absence claim
needs a search over the whole repository. Corrected here and by coord.
lexicon/injection-lexicon.json 0.2.0 -> 0.3.0:
- pattern_id_space.alias_evidence records the two aliases separately instead
of averaging them. llm_ingestion_guard is verified — coverage.py asserts on
that exact string, so it is demonstrably what a guard finding carries.
llm_security is not: it is the pattern table's name, the finding producer
was never supplied, and the known Node finding shape uses title, not label.
- normalisations[].affects now keys on id, with the prose names kept beside it
as affects_labels. An internal cross-reference on label was a second
identity space inside the file the id exists to unify.
Detection data unmoved again: labels, patterns, flags and the ids and aliases
added in 7b70f5b are all byte-identical in sequence; 166/166 Node compiles.
Also: the README lexicon row described thematic families the file does not
have (they are severity families; the theme is the id prefix), and the
conformance convertibility table gained its missing second condition — a case
is buildable only if the label it asserts maps to data this repository
publishes. Eleven cases fail that test (entropy, decoded, the sanitize rows,
the OKF scans), so the buildable set is ~94, not 105.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FaYqid3mejFmd9ZHsiHgp3
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this
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project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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Versioning note: the repository tag versions **the contract** (file set, key names,
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case ids, disposition semantics). Each JSON file additionally carries its own
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`"version"` field, bumped when that file changes.
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## [Unreleased]
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Initial extraction, in progress. Runtime-neutral detection data and the finding contract,
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extracted from the `llm-security` Node implementation and a Python guard without behaviour
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change. **Not yet tagged** — see *Not included* below.
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### Added
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- `schema/finding.schema.json` — the finding contract plus the SARIF output profile.
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Normative. The JSONL profile is deliberately left `unspecified`.
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- `signatures/active-content.json` — the EchoLeak class (CVE-2025-32711): 17 patterns,
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severities, opacity floors and pass order, from the Python guard.
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- `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` — 83 prompt-injection patterns in four families
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(21 critical, 32 high, 22 medium, 8 hybrid).
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- `codepoints/carriers.json` — six carrier tables: zero-width characters, the Unicode Tags
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block, the Supplementary Private Use Areas, BIDI controls, the Cyrillic presence set and
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the 28-entry fold-to-Latin homoglyph map.
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- `signatures/secret-egress.json` — the 18 fixed credential and token shapes. Array order
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is normative.
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- `mapping/owasp-map.json` — four taxonomy maps (LLM, ASI, AST, MCP) over one shared
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16-prefix key set.
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- `calibration/calibration.json` — risk-score tier constants, verdict thresholds, risk-band
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cutoffs, posture grade thresholds.
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### Verification
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Every file above except `calibration.json` was proven rather than transcribed: the data was
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rebuilt **from the commons JSON alone** and diffed against the source implementation. Each
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file records its own result and its own limits.
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`calibration/calibration.json` carries `verified: false`. Its source arrived as a prose
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summary rather than as code, so no differential check was possible, and the file names the
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checks that were not run instead of attaching a caveat to a pass.
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- `docs/lexicon-port-divergence.md` — informative. A differential comparison of the two
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ports of `injection-patterns.mjs` (this repository's and the Python guard's): 83/83
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patterns correspond, 64 are byte-identical, 6 differ only by escaping and are proven
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equivalent, and **13 behave differently**, with a witness input for each and misses on
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both sides. The cause is two different ReDoS mitigations of one table. **No data file was
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changed** — behaviour preservation holds and the finding is reported to the owning
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repositories.
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### Changed
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- `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` **0.2.0 → 0.3.0** — the two aliases are no longer presented
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as equally backed. `pattern_id_space.alias_evidence` now records each one separately:
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`llm_ingestion_guard` is **verified** (the guard's coverage matrix asserts on that exact
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string, so it is demonstrably what a guard finding carries), while `llm_security` is
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**not** — it is the pattern table's own name, and the finding producer was never supplied,
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with the known Node finding shape using `title` rather than `label`. Averaging the two into
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one file-level claim would have repeated the defect this repository corrects per-table
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elsewhere.
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Also: `normalisations[].affects` now keys on `id` with the prose names kept beside it as
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`affects_labels`. An internal cross-reference on label was a second identity space inside
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the file the id was added to unify.
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- `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` **0.1.0 → 0.2.0** — every pattern gains a commons-owned
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`id` and an `aliases` object naming what each seeding runtime calls it, plus a top-level
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`pattern_id_space` block explaining the field. This exists because a `conformance/`
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fixture has to name a finding and the two runtimes do not name the same pattern the same
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way.
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The id was **adopted verbatim from the guard's port**, which already carried both names,
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rather than invented here. Matching was by `label` ↔ `desc` with em-dash normalised to
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hyphen: 83/83, one-to-one, ids unique.
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**No detection data moved.** Labels, patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence,
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no `flags` key was invented (78 before, 78 after), and stripping the three new fields
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reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte — 23 566 bytes, identical. All 83
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patterns still compile in Node bare and under `u` (166/166) and in Python `re` (83/83).
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Neither `llm-security` nor the guard has ratified this id space yet; both were asked by
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coord on 2026-08-09, and the file says so rather than implying agreement.
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### Not included
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- `signatures/malware-signatures.json` — seed data not yet delivered.
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- `spec/decode-pipeline.md` — needs the decode implementation. A normative spec inferred
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from a data dump would be worse than an absent one.
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- `conformance/` — still absent, with half the blocker cleared. 105 of the guard's 134
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coverage cases are convertible to static `input.txt`/`expected.json`; the other 29 assert
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a runtime's API surface, which this repository does not own. Findings can now be **named**
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(see `pattern_id_space` above), but 13 patterns still have no agreed **expected
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behaviour** — the two ports genuinely differ on them — so those fixtures cannot be
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authored until the owning repositories answer.
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These are named in the README as planned rather than linked, so nothing in the repository
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points at a file that does not exist.
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