Kjell Tore Guttormsen
35359b7d8c
scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs accepted only github.com, so the README's
Forgejo example (and /security scan on any Forgejo, Codeberg or self-hosted
URL) failed validation; scan.md and plugin-audit.md also routed only
https://github.com/ to the clone path.
Chose generic HTTPS over adding one host to an allowlist because there is
no documented security reason for the host check. Read before choosing:
git log --follow (import + E12 only), the file's comments, CHANGELOG v2.4.0
("GitHub repo URL support", feature framing), security-hardening-guide §2
and §7 (the sandbox is the defence against filter/smudge drivers), and
review-2026-06-20, which lists "vsix-fetch (HTTPS host allowlist)" as a
protection but no host check for git-clone. What protects a clone is the
OS sandbox, GIT_SANDBOX_CONFIG and GIT_SANDBOX_ENV, for every host alike.
Measured: with GIT_SANDBOX_ENV, git reads 0 config lines outside a repo;
without it, osxkeychain comes from Xcode's system gitconfig. So no stored
credential is offered to an unknown host.
The shape stays strict: https only, no userinfo, host starts and ends
alphanumeric (no leading -), optional port, exactly owner/repo, no query
or fragment. SSH stays GitHub-only: ssh uses the user's own keys and
~/.ssh/config, which the git environment does not isolate.
Tests (red first): Forgejo and any-host accept 2 failing -> green; guards
for http, userinfo, leading -, extra path, query, ext:: and file:: and
non-GitHub SSH hold. The old "rejects non-GitHub URL" case still passes
(it has no owner/repo) and is renamed to say so. Regex timed linear
(< 1 ms at 200k chars). Live: a sandboxed clone of
https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-security.git exits 0 at 5208420,
cleaned up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
94 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: security:plugin-audit
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description: Audit a Claude Code plugin for security risks, permission analysis, and trust assessment before installation
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allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Agent
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model: sonnet
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---
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# /security plugin-audit [path|url]
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Audit a Claude Code plugin for security before installation. Accepts local paths or remote git URLs (HTTPS on any host, SSH on GitHub).
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## Step 1: Resolve Target
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- If `$ARGUMENTS` contains `--branch <name>` → strip it, set `branch = <name>`
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- If `$ARGUMENTS` starts with `https://` or `git@github.com:` →
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Run: `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs clone "<url>" [--branch <branch>]`
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If exit code != 0 → show error to user and **STOP**
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Set `clone_path` = stdout (trimmed), `target = clone_path`
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Set `remote_url = <url>` for display
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- Else if `$ARGUMENTS` is non-empty → `target = $ARGUMENTS`, `clone_path = null`
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- Else → `target = "."`, `clone_path = null`
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- Verify `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` exists at `<target>`. If not and `clone_path != null` → cleanup clone_path first, then tell user this is not a plugin directory and **STOP**. If not and local → tell user and **STOP**.
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## IMPORTANT: Cleanup Guarantee (remote audits)
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If `clone_path != null`, the following cleanup MUST run regardless of audit outcome.
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If ANY step between clone and cleanup fails or errors, STILL run cleanup before stopping:
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1. `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs cleanup "<clone_path>"`
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2. `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs cleanup "<evidence_file>"` (if `evidence_file` is set)
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## Step 1.5: Pre-extraction (remote audits only)
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If `clone_path != null`:
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Get temp path: `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs tmppath "plugin-extract.json"`
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Run: `node <plugin-root>/scanners/content-extractor.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<evidence_file>"`
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If exit code != 0 → set `evidence_file = null` (fall back to direct scan)
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## Step 2: Inventory
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Read plugin.json (name, version, auto_discover). Glob for commands, agents, hooks, skills, knowledge. Build permission matrix from all `allowed-tools` and `tools` declarations. Flag: Bash access, Bash+Write combo, Task (sub-agent spawning), opus for trivial tasks.
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## Step 3: Analyze Hooks
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If `hooks/hooks.json` exists: parse events, read scripts, classify (block/warn/modify). Flag: state modification, network calls, non-CLAUDE env vars, SessionStart hooks.
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## Step 4: Scan Content
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Spawn `subagent_type: "llm-security:skill-scanner-agent"`, `model: "sonnet"`:
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If `evidence_file` is set:
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> EVIDENCE-PACKAGE MODE. Read: \<evidence_file\>
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> Read: \<plugin-root\>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md
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> Analyze all sections. DO NOT use Read/Glob/Grep on the target directory.
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> Check all 7 threat categories. Return findings: file, severity, OWASP ref.
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Otherwise:
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> Scan plugin at \<path\>: commands/*.md, agents/*.md, hooks/scripts/*, skills/*/SKILL.md, knowledge/**/*.md.
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> Read: \<plugin-root\>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md
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> Check all 7 threat categories. Return findings: file, severity, OWASP ref.
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## Step 5: Report
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Output: Plugin metadata, component inventory, permission matrix, hook analysis, security findings, trust verdict.
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Verdict: **Install** (0 critical/high, transparent hooks) | **Review** (high findings or unclear permissions) | **Do Not Install** (critical, exfiltration, persistence, or hidden instructions).
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## Step 6: Cleanup (only if remote)
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If `clone_path != null`:
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Run: `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs cleanup "<clone_path>"`
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If cleanup fails → warn: "Could not remove temp dir <clone_path> — remove manually."
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If `evidence_file != null`:
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Run: `node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs cleanup "<evidence_file>"`
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## Step 7: HTML Report
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After producing the markdown plugin-audit report (Step 5) and any cleanup (Step 6):
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1. Compute a temp markdown path:
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```bash
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node -p "require('path').join(require('os').tmpdir(), 'sec-plugin-audit-' + Date.now() + '.md')"
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```
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2. Use the Write tool to save the **entire markdown report you just produced** (plugin metadata + component inventory + permission matrix + hook analysis + security findings + trust verdict) to that temp path. Verbatim.
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3. Run the renderer:
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```bash
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node <plugin-root>/scripts/render-report.mjs plugin-audit --in "<temp-md-path>"
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```
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The CLI writes `reports/plugin-audit-<YYYYMMDD-HHmmss>.html` relative to CWD and prints `file:///abs/path.html` on stdout.
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4. Append to your response (markdown link, no bare URL):
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> **HTML report:** [Open in browser](file:///abs/path.html)
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If the CLI exits non-zero, mention the error but do not block — the markdown report above is the primary deliverable.
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