f153f969a0
Add /ultraresearch-local for structured research combining local codebase analysis with external knowledge via parallel agent swarms. Produces research briefs with triangulation, confidence ratings, and source quality assessment. New command: /ultraresearch-local with modes --quick, --local, --external, --fg. New agents: research-orchestrator (opus), docs-researcher, community-researcher, security-researcher, contrarian-researcher, gemini-bridge (all sonnet). New template: research-brief-template.md. Integration: --research flag in /ultraplan-local accepts pre-built research briefs (up to 3), enriches the interview and exploration phases. Planning orchestrator cross-references brief findings during synthesis. Design principle: Context Engineering — right information to right agent at right time. Research briefs are structured artifacts in the pipeline: ultraresearch → brief → ultraplan --research → plan → ultraexecute. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
176 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
176 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
# Threat Model: [System Name]
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<!--
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TEMPLATE USAGE
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This is the output template for `/security threat-model`.
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The threat-modeler-agent uses this as a formatting guide — fill every section with real findings
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from the 5-phase interview workflow. Do NOT output placeholder text. If a section is not
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applicable, write "Not applicable — [brief reason]."
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-->
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**Date:** [today's date]
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**Scope:** [brief system description from Phase 1]
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**Frameworks:** STRIDE + MAESTRO 7-Layer + OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) + OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
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**Status:** Advisory — AI-generated. Requires review by a qualified security practitioner.
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---
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## 1. System Description
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[2-4 sentence description of what the system does, who uses it, and how it is deployed.
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Derived from Phase 1 interview answers.]
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---
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## 2. Architecture Overview
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[Text-based architecture diagram from Phase 2 component mapping, with trust boundaries marked.]
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---
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## 3. MAESTRO Layer Mapping
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| Layer | Components Present | Attack Surface Rating |
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|-------|-------------------|----------------------|
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| L1 Foundation Models | [models used] | [Low/Medium/High] |
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| L2 Data and Knowledge | [knowledge files, state files] | [...] |
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| L3 Agent Frameworks | [hooks active, permission model] | [...] |
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| L4 Tool Integration | [MCP servers, Bash, filesystem] | [...] |
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| L5 Agent Capabilities | [commands, agents, skills] | [...] |
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| L6 Multi-Agent Systems | [pipelines, delegation patterns] | [...] |
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| L7 Ecosystem | [plugins, integrations, CI/CD] | [...] |
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---
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## 4. Threat Catalog
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### Layer [X] — [Layer Name]
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#### Threat [X.1]: [Short threat title]
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| STRIDE | [S/T/R/I/D/E] |
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| OWASP | [LLM0X or ASI0X] |
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| Likelihood | [1-5] — [rationale] |
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| Impact | [1-5] — [rationale] |
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| Risk Score | [L×I] — [Critical/High/Medium/Low] |
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| Wild Exploitation | [Yes/PoC/No] — [cite source if yes] |
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**Attack scenario:** [Concrete description of how this threat plays out in this system.]
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**Current control status:** [Already mitigated / Can be mitigated / Accepted / External]
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**Recommendation:** [Specific, actionable mitigation. Reference the mitigation matrix
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control type: Automated / Configured / Advisory.]
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---
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[Repeat for each threat, grouped by MAESTRO layer]
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---
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## 5. Risk Matrix
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| Threat | Layer | STRIDE | OWASP | Score | Priority |
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|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|
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| [Threat title] | L[X] | [category] | [ID] | [score] | [Critical/High/Medium/Low] |
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[Sorted by score descending]
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---
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## 6. Mitigation Plan
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### Critical and High Priority Actions
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| # | Threat | Action | Control Type | Effort |
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|---|--------|--------|-------------|--------|
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| 1 | [Threat] | [Specific action] | Automated/Configured/Advisory | Low/Med/High |
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[Sorted by risk priority]
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### Already Mitigated
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| Threat | Control | Evidence |
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|--------|---------|---------|
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| [Threat] | [What control] | [File or config that confirms it] |
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### Accepted Risks
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| Threat | Rationale | Owner |
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|--------|-----------|-------|
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| [Threat] | [Why accepted] | [Who owns this decision] |
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---
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## 7. Residual Risk Summary
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[2-4 sentences summarizing the overall risk posture after applying recommended mitigations.
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Identify the highest-impact residual risk and what it would take to address it.]
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**Threat model coverage:** [X] threats identified across [Y] MAESTRO layers.
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**Critical:** [n] | **High:** [n] | **Medium:** [n] | **Low:** [n]
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---
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## 8. Assumptions and Limitations
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- This threat model is based on information provided in the interview session and file
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analysis at the time of generation. System changes may invalidate findings.
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- Threat likelihood ratings reflect the analyst's assessment; actual exploitation depends
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on attacker capability and motivation not fully modeled here.
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- External controls (IAM, network policy, model provider security) are noted as dependencies
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but not verified.
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- This document is advisory. It does not constitute a security audit or penetration test.
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Engage a qualified security practitioner before production deployment of high-risk systems.
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---
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*Generated by threat-modeler-agent (llm-security plugin)*
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*Frameworks: STRIDE · MAESTRO · OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) · OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)*
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<!--
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RISK SCORING LOGIC
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Risk Score = Likelihood × Impact (both on a 1-5 scale)
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| Score | Priority | Action |
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|-------|----------|--------|
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| 20-25 | Critical | Address before deployment |
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| 12-19 | High | Address in current sprint |
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| 6-11 | Medium | Schedule for remediation |
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| 1-5 | Low | Monitor, accept, or defer |
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Likelihood scale (1-5):
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1 — Theoretical, no known exploitation path
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2 — Unlikely, requires unusual attacker access
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3 — Plausible, standard attacker capability
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4 — Likely, low-cost exploitation
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5 — Near-certain, trivial or already exploited in wild
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Impact scale (1-5):
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1 — Minimal — inconvenience, no data loss, easily reversible
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2 — Low — minor data exposure or disruption, limited blast radius
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3 — Medium — credential leakage, significant disruption, or reputational harm
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4 — High — production system compromise, mass credential theft, persistent backdoor
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5 — Critical — complete system compromise, irreversible data loss, regulatory breach
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CONTROL STATUS CATEGORIES
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- Already mitigated — Evidence exists in the project (hook present, tool restriction in
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frontmatter, CLAUDE.md scope-guard, gitignore excludes secrets).
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Cite the specific file.
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- Can be mitigated — A specific, actionable control exists. State exactly what to do.
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- Partially mitigated — A control exists but has gaps. Describe what the gap is.
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- Accepted risk — The threat is real, but the system's constraints make mitigation
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impractical. Document the decision and the reasoning.
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- External dependency — Mitigation requires organizational controls outside Claude Code
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scope (IAM, network policy, vendor security). Note the dependency.
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THREAT COUNT QUALITY GUIDANCE
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5-10 well-described threats with concrete attack scenarios and specific recommendations
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are more useful than 25 thin entries with generic rationale. Prioritize depth over breadth.
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Group threats tightly by MAESTRO layer — avoid repeating the same threat class across layers
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unless the attack vector genuinely differs.
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-->
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