fix(hooks): the write guard covers Edit and NotebookEdit and fails closed

hooks.json wired pre-write-executor.mjs to the Write tool only, so Edit and
NotebookEdit reached .git/hooks/, .env, shell configs and the other protected
paths unguarded. The matcher is now Write|Edit|NotebookEdit.

The guard reads the target path per tool: file_path for Write and Edit (hooks
reference, PreToolUse tool_input tables), notebook_path for NotebookEdit (the
tool's input schema). When it cannot read a path (unparseable input, unknown
tool, missing field) it now blocks instead of allowing.

New tests resolve hooks.json with Claude Code's matcher semantics and run the
hooks that would fire per tool: 9 failed on the old code, all pass now. The two
fail-open pins in path-guard.test.mjs are flipped to fail closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-10-06 15:54:47 +02:00

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Security Policy — trekplan

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately to security@fromaitochitta.com — do not open a public issue. There is no SLA — this is a solo-maintained plugin — but acknowledged reports are usually triaged within 7 days.

If you already have an account on the Forgejo instance, you may instead open a private issue on the repo, tagged security:

https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/voyage

Supported versions

Only the current minor version receives security fixes. When v3.2.0 ships, v3.1.x stops receiving patches. Pin to the latest minor and update on the next bump.

Version	Supported
3.1.x	Yes
3.0.x	No (upgrade to 3.1.x)
< 3.0	No

Scope

The plugin's security posture covers:

Plugin-owned hooks (`hooks/scripts/`)

Hook	Trigger	Purpose
`pre-bash-executor.mjs`	`PreToolUse` for Bash	BLOCKs known-dangerous shell patterns; WARNs on suspicious ones; fails open on parse errors
`pre-write-executor.mjs`	`PreToolUse` for Write, Edit, NotebookEdit	BLOCKs writes to `.git/hooks/`, `~/.ssh/`, `.env`, and other sensitive paths; fails closed when it cannot read the target path
`pre-compact-flush.mjs`	`PreCompact`	Flushes `progress.json` from git history before compaction (P0 drift fix); read-only beyond `progress.json`
`session-title.mjs` (planned, F9)	`UserPromptSubmit`	Sets session title `voyage:<command>:<slug>` for telling parallel sessions apart

All hooks are zero-dependency Node.js (.mjs) scripts and are designed to fail open — a hook crash never blocks the user's work. Hooks log to stderr only; they never write to user files outside their declared scope.

Prompt-level denylist (`commands/trekexecute.md`)

The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in a session where a hook does not fire. This is layer 2 of the three-layer defense-in-depth model (README, Security hardening) and protects against plan-injected destructive commands.

Validators (`lib/validators/*.mjs`)

Read-only. Never write to user files. Used both by hooks and by command phases to detect malformed artifacts before they propagate.

Out of scope

Opt-in upstream architect step. Any external producer of architecture/overview.md ships its own security posture. The architecture-discovery validator in this plugin treats architecture/overview.md as an external contract (drift-WARN, never drift-FAIL).
LLM output content. The plugin validates artifact shape, not artifact truthfulness. A plan that passes plan-validator --strict may still contain hallucinated file paths or unsafe commands; that is why pre-bash-executor exists.
The Claude Code CLI itself. Report Claude Code vulnerabilities to Anthropic via https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues.

Hardening recommendations

For fork-ers handling untrusted task briefs or plans:

Set disableSkillShellExecution: true in ~/.claude/settings.json (CC v2.1.91+) to prevent Skills from invoking arbitrary shell.

Run plan validation in --strict mode before any execute:

node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/lib/validators/plan-validator.mjs --strict plan.md

Review the plan-critic adversarial output before approving plans from external sources — semantic rubric (rule #7) catches deferred decisions that an attacker could exploit.
Pin a CC version floor. v3.1.0 of this plugin assumes CC ≥ 2.1.85 for the if-field on hooks; older CC silently ignores the field, weakening the scoping.

Past advisories

None as of v3.1.0. This section will list CVE-style entries if any are discovered.

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