Kjell Tore Guttormsen
d97e9b5b19
Phase 4.7 of /trekreview runs security-engine.mjs choose first. Claude
Security runs through its own skill (scan changes --base {before_sha}
--effort high); its cost question goes to the operator, and "No", a
question nobody can answer or a missing Workflow tool records it as not
run, never a fallback to /security-review. /security-review runs only
when choose picked it. Its report is converted by security-engine.mjs
convert, never transcribed; below_threshold is declined as
engine:below-threshold. With no engine the expected reviewer
security-engine never reports, so the verdict gate exits 2 and the
summary says "security: not measured" and why, never 0. --quick keeps no
security engine. The Engine summary line, the template's ran line, the
hard rules (the engine's report folder, scan changes only) and the
allowed-tools (Workflow) follow.
Engine prose follows in commands/trekexecute.md, docs/command-modes.md,
docs/architecture.md, CLAUDE.md, README.md, SECURITY.md and Handover 6:
Claude Security recommended, proprietary so called by name and never a
manifest dependency; without it /security-review; with neither "not
measured".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
127 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy — trekplan
|
|
|
|
## Reporting a vulnerability
|
|
|
|
Report privately to <security@fromaitochitta.com> — do not open a public
|
|
issue. There is no SLA — this is a solo-maintained plugin — but
|
|
acknowledged reports are usually triaged within 7 days.
|
|
|
|
If you already have an account on the Forgejo instance, you may instead
|
|
open a **private** issue on the repo, tagged `security`:
|
|
|
|
> https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/voyage
|
|
|
|
## Supported versions
|
|
|
|
Only the **current minor version** receives security fixes. When v3.2.0
|
|
ships, v3.1.x stops receiving patches. Pin to the latest minor and
|
|
update on the next bump.
|
|
|
|
| Version | Supported |
|
|
|---------|-----------|
|
|
| 3.1.x | Yes |
|
|
| 3.0.x | No (upgrade to 3.1.x) |
|
|
| < 3.0 | No |
|
|
|
|
## Scope
|
|
|
|
The plugin's security posture covers:
|
|
|
|
### Plugin-owned hooks (`hooks/scripts/`)
|
|
|
|
| Hook | Trigger | Purpose |
|
|
|------|---------|---------|
|
|
| `pre-bash-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Bash | BLOCKs known-dangerous shell patterns; WARNs on suspicious ones; answers `ask` before merge into `main`, push, tag/publish and destructive git (P12); fails open on parse errors |
|
|
| `pre-write-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Write, Edit, NotebookEdit | BLOCKs writes to `.git/hooks/`, `~/.ssh/`, `.env`, and other sensitive paths, to Voyage's own state in the git directory (`voyage/`), and to test files a step has locked (P9); fails closed when it cannot read the target path or the lock, or cannot load the lock code |
|
|
| `pre-plan-gate.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for ExitPlanMode | Runs Voyage's plan gate on a Voyage plan (it carries `plan_version`) and denies one the gate refuses; asks with "not measured" when the gate cannot run; other plans pass (P3) |
|
|
| `post-approval-log.mjs` | `PostToolUse` for Bash, ExitPlanMode | Writes an approved merge/push to `main`, tag/publish, or Voyage plan to the approval log; says "not logged" when it cannot |
|
|
| `post-edit-check.mjs` | `PostToolUse` for Edit, Write | Runs the target repo's own formatter and linter on the edited file, check-only, while Voyage executes a plan there or the repo has switched it on (P7) |
|
|
| `stop-test-lock.mjs` | `Stop` | Refuses "done" while the session's step holds its test lock; lets the stop through when `stop_hook_active` is set (P9) |
|
|
| `pre-compact-flush.mjs` | `PreCompact` | Flushes `progress.json` from git history before compaction (P0 drift fix); read-only beyond `progress.json` |
|
|
| `session-title.mjs` *(planned, F9)* | `UserPromptSubmit` | Sets session title `voyage:<command>:<slug>` for telling parallel sessions apart |
|
|
|
|
All hooks are zero-dependency Node.js (`.mjs`) scripts. Most are designed
|
|
to **fail open** — a hook crash never blocks the user's work. The
|
|
exceptions are stated per hook above: the write guard fails closed when it
|
|
cannot read a path or a test lock, and the plan gate asks rather than
|
|
passes when it cannot run. No hook runs a model. Hooks never write to user
|
|
files outside their declared scope; the test lock and the post-edit log
|
|
live in the repository's git directory (`<git dir>/voyage/`), where they
|
|
cannot be committed.
|
|
|
|
### Precondition: mods
|
|
|
|
Voyage's guards are deterministic only when no installed mod handles `tool.check`.
|
|
A Claude Code mod that handles `tool.check` answers after the permission
|
|
rules and the `PreToolUse` hooks have decided, and its answer can replace
|
|
theirs: it can approve a call a plugin hook blocked or asked about, and
|
|
outside managed settings and Team/Enterprise plans it can approve a call a
|
|
deny rule refuses (code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions, § Extend
|
|
permissions with hooks). Voyage's hooks cannot tell whether such a mod is installed:
|
|
no hook input names the loaded mods. `/plugin` shows them to a person
|
|
(`N mods active · …`). Voyage itself ships no mods.
|
|
|
|
### Prompt-level denylist (`commands/trekexecute.md`)
|
|
|
|
The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in a session
|
|
where a hook does not fire. This is layer 2 of the three-layer
|
|
defense-in-depth model (README, Security hardening) and protects against
|
|
plan-injected destructive commands.
|
|
|
|
### Validators (`lib/validators/*.mjs`)
|
|
|
|
Read-only. Never write to user files. Used both by hooks and by command
|
|
phases to detect malformed artifacts before they propagate.
|
|
|
|
### The review's security engine (`/trekreview`)
|
|
|
|
`/trekreview` hands security review of a delivery to one engine and never
|
|
reports a 0 it did not measure. Claude Security is recommended: Anthropic's
|
|
plugin, with a proprietary licence, so Voyage calls it by name
|
|
(`claude-security:claude-security`, `scan changes` only, after its own cost
|
|
question to the operator) and it is never a dependency in Voyage's manifest.
|
|
Without it, Claude Code's `/security-review` is used. With neither, security
|
|
is "not measured" and the verdict gate exits 2 (never green).
|
|
`lib/review/security-engine.mjs` chooses the engine and converts Claude
|
|
Security's report (`CLAUDE-SECURITY-<ts>/`, written by Claude Security in the
|
|
repo root behind its own `.gitignore`) as data: nothing in it is run or
|
|
followed, and a stamp counts only when it names exactly the reviewed head and
|
|
base. A Claude Security finding blocks only at confidence `high`; the rest
|
|
are listed under Declined to Judge and keep the review from `ALLOW`. Neither
|
|
engine edits code.
|
|
|
|
## Out of scope
|
|
|
|
- **Opt-in upstream architect step.** Any external producer of
|
|
`architecture/overview.md` ships its own security posture. The
|
|
architecture-discovery validator in this plugin treats
|
|
`architecture/overview.md` as an external contract (drift-WARN, never
|
|
drift-FAIL).
|
|
- **LLM output content.** The plugin validates artifact *shape*, not
|
|
artifact *truthfulness*. A plan that passes `plan-validator --strict`
|
|
may still contain hallucinated file paths or unsafe commands; that is
|
|
why `pre-bash-executor` exists.
|
|
- **The Claude Code CLI itself.** Report Claude Code vulnerabilities to
|
|
Anthropic via https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues.
|
|
|
|
## Hardening recommendations
|
|
|
|
For fork-ers handling untrusted task briefs or plans:
|
|
|
|
1. **Set `disableSkillShellExecution: true`** in `~/.claude/settings.json`
|
|
(CC v2.1.91+) to prevent Skills from invoking arbitrary shell.
|
|
2. **Run plan validation in `--strict` mode** before any execute:
|
|
```bash
|
|
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/lib/validators/plan-validator.mjs --strict plan.md
|
|
```
|
|
3. **Review the plan-critic adversarial output** before approving plans
|
|
from external sources — semantic rubric (rule #7) catches deferred
|
|
decisions that an attacker could exploit.
|
|
4. **Pin a CC version floor.** v3.1.0 of this plugin assumes CC ≥
|
|
2.1.85 for the `if`-field on hooks; older CC silently ignores the
|
|
field, weakening the scoping.
|
|
|
|
## Past advisories
|
|
|
|
None as of v3.1.0. This section will list CVE-style entries if any are
|
|
discovered.
|