voyage/tests/validators/brief-threat-model.test.mjs

// tests/validators/brief-threat-model.test.mjs
// E 2.1 — the optional `## Threat Model` in a brief (decisions 164, 218):
// bullets `- Inside: <text>` / `- Outside: <text>`. Present and malformed (no
// bullet, another label, empty text, two such sections) is
// BRIEF_THREAT_MODEL_MALFORMED; absent is today's rule. No brief_version bump
// (the ceremony / artifact_store precedent). The intent hash covers the section
// when it is present, so an edited threat model makes the approval stale; a
// brief without one hashes as before.

import { test } from 'node:test';
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { TM, briefWith } from '../helpers/threat-model-brief.mjs';

const HERE = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const ROOT = join(HERE, '..', '..');
const validator = () => import(join(ROOT, 'lib', 'validators', 'brief-validator.mjs'));
const approval = () => import(join(ROOT, 'lib', 'validators', 'intent-approval.mjs'));
const read = (rel) => readFileSync(join(ROOT, rel), 'utf8');

const brief = (threat = '') => briefWith(threat);

const codes = (r) => r.errors.map((e) => e.code);
const STAMP_AT = new Date('2026-11-08T08:00:00Z');
const FENCE = '```';

// ---- the validator ----

test('a well-formed threat model is valid; absent is today\'s rule', async () => {
  const { validateBriefContent } = await validator();
  assert.deepEqual(codes(validateBriefContent(brief(TM))), []);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(validateBriefContent(brief())), []);
  const onlyInside = '## Threat Model\n\n- Inside: untrusted input from a web form\n';
  assert.deepEqual(codes(validateBriefContent(brief(onlyInside))), []);
});

test('malformed: no bullet, another label, empty text, two sections — each BRIEF_THREAT_MODEL_MALFORMED', async () => {
  const { validateBriefContent } = await validator();
  const cases = {
    'no bullet': '## Threat Model\n\nAnything a stranger sends.\n',
    'empty section': '## Threat Model\n\n',
    'another label': '## Threat Model\n\n- Inside: uploads\n- Scope: the whole app\n',
    'lower-case label': '## Threat Model\n\n- outside: a local user\n',
    'empty text': '## Threat Model\n\n- Inside: uploads\n- Outside:\n',
    'blank text': '## Threat Model\n\n- Inside:    \n',
    'two sections': `${TM}\n${TM}`,
  };
  for (const [name, section] of Object.entries(cases)) {
    const r = validateBriefContent(brief(section));
    assert.equal(r.valid, false, `${name}: must not be valid`);
    assert.deepEqual(codes(r), ['BRIEF_THREAT_MODEL_MALFORMED'], name);
  }
});

test('a ## Threat Model inside a code fence is text, not a section (no false malformed, no second section)', async () => {
  const { validateBriefContent } = await validator();
  const fenced = `${FENCE}markdown\n## Threat Model\n\nnot a bullet\n${FENCE}\n`;
  assert.deepEqual(codes(validateBriefContent(brief(fenced))), []);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(validateBriefContent(brief(`${TM}\n${fenced}`))), []);
});

test('the malformed message names the section and the bullet form', async () => {
  const { validateBriefContent } = await validator();
  const e = validateBriefContent(brief('## Threat Model\n\n- Scope: all\n')).errors[0];
  assert.ok(e, 'an error');
  assert.match(`${e.message} ${e.hint || ''}`, /## Threat Model/);
  assert.match(`${e.message} ${e.hint || ''}`, /- Inside: <text>/);
  assert.match(`${e.message} ${e.hint || ''}`, /- Outside: <text>/);
});

test('no brief_version bump: the template stays at 2.2 and documents the optional section with both bullets', () => {
  const tpl = read('templates/trekbrief-template.md');
  assert.match(tpl, /^brief_version: "2\.2"$/m);
  const at = tpl.indexOf('\n## Threat Model');
  assert.ok(at > 0, 'the template documents ## Threat Model');
  const sec = tpl.slice(at, tpl.indexOf('\n## ', at + 4));
  assert.match(sec, /optional/i);
  assert.match(sec, /^- Inside: /m);
  assert.match(sec, /^- Outside: /m);
});

// ---- the intent hash ----

test('red before E: an edited threat model makes the approval stale (BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE)', async () => {
  const { stampIntentApproval, checkIntentApprovalContent } = await approval();
  const stamped = stampIntentApproval(brief(TM), STAMP_AT).text;
  assert.deepEqual(codes(checkIntentApprovalContent(stamped)), []);
  const edited = stamped.replace("can already edit the repo's hooks", 'can reach the network');
  assert.notEqual(edited, stamped);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(checkIntentApprovalContent(edited)), ['BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE']);
});

test('adding or removing a threat model after the approval makes it stale', async () => {
  const { stampIntentApproval, checkIntentApprovalContent } = await approval();
  const plain = stampIntentApproval(brief(), STAMP_AT).text;
  const added = plain.replace('## Success Criteria', `${TM}\n## Success Criteria`);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(checkIntentApprovalContent(added)), ['BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE'], 'added');
  const withTm = stampIntentApproval(brief(TM), STAMP_AT).text;
  const removed = withTm.replace(TM, '');
  assert.deepEqual(codes(checkIntentApprovalContent(removed)), ['BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE'], 'removed');
});

test('two ## Threat Model sections: null hash, the stamp refuses and the check is INVALID', async () => {
  const { computeIntentHash, stampIntentApproval, checkIntentApprovalContent } = await approval();
  const two = brief(`${TM}\n${TM}`);
  const body = two.split('---\n').slice(2).join('---\n');
  const h = computeIntentHash(body);
  assert.equal(h.hash, null);
  assert.deepEqual(h.duplicate, ['Threat Model']);
  assert.equal(stampIntentApproval(two).stamped, false);
  const forged = two.replace('framing: new-direction\n',
    `framing: new-direction\nintent_approved_hash: "sha256:${'0'.repeat(64)}"\n`);
  const r = checkIntentApprovalContent(forged);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(r), ['BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_INVALID']);
  assert.match(r.errors[0].message, /## Threat Model appears more than once/);
});

test('whitespace-only reflow inside the threat model keeps the approval (normalized, as Intent and Goal)', async () => {
  const { stampIntentApproval, checkIntentApprovalContent } = await approval();
  const stamped = stampIntentApproval(brief(TM), STAMP_AT).text;
  const reflowed = stamped.replace('- Inside: a crafted file name', '-   Inside:   a crafted   file name');
  assert.notEqual(reflowed, stamped);
  assert.deepEqual(codes(checkIntentApprovalContent(reflowed)), []);
});

test('a brief without a threat model hashes exactly as before (no stamped brief goes stale)', async () => {
  const { computeIntentHash } = await approval();
  const { createHash } = await import('node:crypto');
  const body = brief().split('---\n').slice(2).join('---\n');
  const parts = ['Uploads arrive from strangers.', 'A hook that checks each upload.'];
  const expected = `sha256:${createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(parts), 'utf8').digest('hex')}`;
  assert.equal(computeIntentHash(body).hash, expected);
});

test('the stale message names ## Threat Model (intent-approval.mjs and the /trekplan halt table)', async () => {
  const { stampIntentApproval, checkIntentApprovalContent } = await approval();
  const stamped = stampIntentApproval(brief(TM), STAMP_AT).text;
  const e = checkIntentApprovalContent(stamped.replace('reaches the shell', 'reaches a log')).errors[0];
  assert.ok(e, 'a stale error');
  assert.match(e.message, /## Threat Model/);
  const plan = read('commands/trekplan.md');
  const row = plan.split('\n').find((l) => l.startsWith('| `BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE` |'));
  assert.ok(row, 'the halt table has the stale row');
  assert.match(row, /`## Threat Model`/);
});

// ---- /trekbrief prose ----

function section(text, heading) {
  const start = text.indexOf(`\n## ${heading}`);
  assert.ok(start >= 0, `missing ## ${heading}`);
  const next = text.indexOf('\n## ', start + 4);
  return text.slice(start, next < 0 ? undefined : next);
}

test('/trekbrief offers the section when the task touches a guard, a gate, untrusted input, secrets or publishing', () => {
  const p3 = section(read('commands/trekbrief.md'), 'Phase 3').replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
  assert.match(p3, /`## Threat Model`/);
  for (const w of ['a guard', 'a gate', 'untrusted input', 'secrets', 'publishing']) {
    assert.ok(p3.includes(w), `Phase 3 names «${w}» as a reason to offer the threat model`);
  }
});

test('/trekbrief writes the section only when given, as one-line Inside/Outside bullets', () => {
  const text = read('commands/trekbrief.md');
  const draft = text.slice(text.indexOf('**Step 4a'), text.indexOf('**Step 4b')).replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
  assert.match(draft, /\*\*Threat Model:\*\*/);
  assert.match(draft, /`- Inside: <text>`/);
  assert.match(draft, /`- Outside: <text>`/);
});

test('/trekbrief Phase 4h shows ## Threat Model verbatim at the approval, and --approve reads it out', () => {
  const p4h = section(read('commands/trekbrief.md'), 'Phase 4h').replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
  assert.match(p4h, /`## Intent`, `## Goal` and, when present, `## Threat Model`[^.]*\*\*verbatim\*\*/);
  assert.match(p4h, /`--approve` mode[^.]*`## Threat Model`/);
  assert.match(p4h, /`## Threat Model`[^.]*afterwards makes the approval stale/);
});