Address findings from pedagogical review simulating a non-expert user: - Add CLAUDE.md to project root (was referenced but missing) - Fix README score from 12/9/1 to 13/8/1 (match feature-map.md) - Add Expected Output sections to examples 01, 02, 05, 09, 10 - Create pipeline-output/ and briefings/ directories - Add example ordering guidance in README - Add plan requirements for examples 11/13 in prerequisites - Add skill frontmatter explanation in GETTING-STARTED.md - Explain Cowork/Dispatch with links in cowork-integration - Expand .gitignore with node_modules and generated output files - Add model override hints in agent frontmatter comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Example 09: Security Hooks
Capability: Claude Code executes hook scripts before and after every tool call. PreToolUse hooks can block dangerous operations. PostToolUse hooks create audit trails.
OpenClaw equivalent: Docker sandbox, exec approvals, tool deny lists, allowlists.
How the Hooks Work
The hooks/ directory in this repo contains two scripts:
pre-tool-use.sh- runs before every Bash tool call. Blocks destructive patterns.post-tool-use.sh- runs after every tool call. Appends tohooks/audit.log.
Both are registered in .claude/settings.json under the hooks key.
The Prompt
Try running this shell command: rm -rf /tmp/test-deletion-target
Before running it, explain what you expect the PreToolUse hook to do.
After the attempt, check hooks/audit.log and show me the last 5 entries.
Then explain what was blocked and why it was flagged by the hook.
What Happens
- Claude Code calls the Bash tool with
rm -rf /tmp/test-deletion-target - Before execution,
pre-tool-use.shreceives the command as input - The hook matches the
rm -rfpattern and exits with a non-zero code - Claude Code receives the block signal and does not execute the command
post-tool-use.shlogs the blocked attempt with timestamp and tool name- Claude Code reports what happened and shows the audit log
Reading the Audit Log
tail -20 hooks/audit.log
Each entry has the format: [timestamp] TOOL: bash | STATUS: blocked | CMD: rm -rf ...
Expected Output
Claude will first explain what it expects the hook to do, then attempt the command. You should see something like:
I expect the PreToolUse hook (hooks/pre-tool-use.sh) to intercept this
command because it matches the "rm -rf" pattern in the blocked list...
[Claude attempts: rm -rf /tmp/test-deletion-target]
[Hook blocks the command]
The command was blocked by the PreToolUse hook. The hook matched "rm -rf"
in the command string and returned exit code 2 with a block decision.
The audit log (hooks/audit.log) will contain an entry like:
[2026-03-26T10:15:23] TOOL: bash | STATUS: blocked | CMD: rm -rf /tmp/test-deletion-target
How you know it worked:
- The
rm -rfcommand was NOT executed (nothing was deleted) - Claude reported the hook blocked it
hooks/audit.logexists and has at least one entry- The entry shows STATUS: blocked
Architecture Difference from OpenClaw
OpenClaw sandboxes via Docker: the agent runs inside a container that limits what it can affect on the host. Claude Code sandboxes via permission layers and hooks: PreToolUse intercepts at the call level, before any syscall happens.
For personal use, hooks are more flexible. You write exactly the rules you need.
For untrusted third-party agents, Docker isolation is stronger. See
security/nemoclaw-comparison.md for a full breakdown.