Wave C step C3: closes E14 with the user-facing reset command.
After a legitimate MCP server upgrade the sticky baseline (added in C1)
becomes a stale "what the tool used to say" anchor and every subsequent
post-mcp-verify advisory will re-flag the change. /security mcp-baseline-reset
lets the user acknowledge the upgrade so the next call seeds a fresh
baseline.
New files:
- scanners/mcp-baseline-reset.mjs — small CLI wrapper around clearBaseline /
listBaselines. Modes: --list (read-only), --target <name>, no-args (all).
Outputs JSON summary on stdout. Exit 0 always (idempotent).
- commands/mcp-baseline-reset.md — dispatcher following mcp-inspect.md
shape. Frontmatter: name=security:mcp-baseline-reset, sonnet model,
Read/Bash/AskUserQuestion tools. 4-step body (list -> confirm scope
-> execute -> confirm result).
- tests/scanners/mcp-baseline-reset.test.mjs — 10 CLI tests across
--list, --target, clear-all, idempotency, history preservation, and
bare-positional sugar.
Updated:
- commands/security.md — new row in commands table after mcp-inspect.
- CLAUDE.md — new commands-table row + new v7.3.0 narrative section
describing the baseline schema, cumulative-drift detection, reset
semantics, and the LLM_SECURITY_MCP_CACHE_FILE override.
- Plugin README.md — new MCP-baseline-reset row in commands table,
scanner count 12 standalone -> 13 standalone, new "MCP Description
Drift (E14, v7.3.0)" subsection explaining the sticky baseline,
cumulative threshold, reset semantics, and env-var override.
- Root marketplace README.md — scanner count 22 -> 23 (10 orchestrated +
13 standalone), command count 19 -> 20, test count 1511 -> 1768.
Wave C complete: 1738 -> 1768 tests (+30 across C1/C2/C3). Per plan,
Wave C does NOT bump the plugin version — that lands at the wave-bundle
release. The advisory text in post-mcp-verify already references the
new command path so the user has a ready remediation step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave C step C1: extend the MCP description cache schema with a sticky
baseline slot per tool and a rolling history array (last 10 drift events).
Cumulative drift = levenshtein(current, baseline) / max(|current|, |baseline|);
emits a separate signal when ratio >= mcp.cumulative_drift_threshold
(default 0.25). Per-update drift logic and threshold unchanged.
- loadCache(): TTL purge now skips entries with a baseline, preserving
cumulative-drift detection across the 7-day window. v7.2.0 entries
(no history field) are migrated on read by seeding baseline from the
current description and adding an empty history array. Entries with
history but no baseline (post-clearBaseline) are NOT re-seeded.
- checkDescriptionDrift(): when an entry exists with history but no
baseline (i.e. baseline was cleared), the next call re-seeds baseline
from the incoming description so the legitimate next version becomes
the new baseline.
- clearBaseline(toolName?): removes baseline for one tool or all tools.
Preserves description / firstSeen / lastSeen / history.
- listBaselines(): read-only listing for the upcoming reset CLI.
- LLM_SECURITY_MCP_CACHE_FILE env var override for end-to-end testing.
- New policy key mcp.cumulative_drift_threshold (default 0.25).
Tests: 23 new unit tests; existing 10 still pass.
Docs deferred: CLAUDE.md update lands in C3 alongside the new
/security mcp-baseline-reset command. C2 adds the hooks-table footer
note. Combined wave docs match plan §"Wave C — Touch" list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes E11. Three new pieces, plus integration:
1. Re-interpolation detector (Appsmith GHSL-2024-277 stealth pattern).
The scanner now collects env: bindings (key -> source-expression
text) by walking parsed events whose parentChain includes 'env',
then for each `${{ env.<KEY> }}` inside run:, re-injects MEDIUM
if the binding source matches the 23-field blacklist. This
catches the pattern where developers apply env-indirection but
then re-interpolate the env var in run:, which cancels the
mitigation (template substitution happens before shell parsing).
2. Auth-bypass category (Synacktiv 2023 Dependabot spoofing).
Detects `if: ${{ github.actor == 'dependabot[bot]' }}` and
variants. MEDIUM, owasp: 'LLM06' (Excessive Agency). Distinct
from injection — same expression syntax, different threat class.
Recommendation steers users to `github.event.pull_request.user.login`.
3. severity.mjs OWASP map registration. WFL prefix added to all
four maps:
- OWASP_MAP['WFL'] = ['LLM02', 'LLM06']
- OWASP_AGENTIC_MAP['WFL'] = ['ASI04']
- OWASP_SKILLS_MAP['WFL'] = []
- OWASP_MCP_MAP['WFL'] = []
Empty arrays for skills/MCP are explicit, not omitted — keeps
`Object.keys(OWASP_MAP)` symmetric across maps.
4. scan-orchestrator.mjs registration. workflowScan added between
supply-chain and toxic-flow (toxic-flow correlates after primaries).
Verified via integration: orchestrator emits 9 WFL findings on
tests/fixtures/workflows/.
Bug fix: extractTriggers in workflow-yaml-state.mjs was collecting
sub-properties (`branches:`, `types:`) as triggers. Now tracks the
first nested indent level and ignores anything deeper.
Tests:
- 6 new cases in tests/scanners/workflow-scanner.test.mjs:
re-interp TP, no-double-count, auth-bypass TP, auth-bypass FP
(startsWith head_ref is not auth-bypass), OWASP map shape,
orchestrator import + SCANNERS array entry.
- 2 new fixtures: tp-reinterpolation.yml, auth-bypass-dependabot.yml.
- Existing 14 scanner tests + 15 state-machine tests unchanged.
Test count: 1732 -> 1738 (+6). Wave B total: +53 over baseline 1685.
Pre-compact-scan flake unchanged (passes in isolation).
Adds a scope-hopping detector to the npm install gate. When a user
installs `@<scope>/<unscoped>`, the hook now emits a MEDIUM warning
on stderr (exit 0, never blocks) if:
- `<unscoped>` matches a popular npm package (POPULAR_NPM, ~80
names from knowledge/top-packages.json), AND
- `<scope>` is not on NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES (built-in 22 entries) or
on policy.json `supply_chain.allowed_scopes`.
Why: an attacker publishing `@evilcorp/lodash` cannot squat the bare
`lodash` name, but they can register an unrelated scope and rely on
typo or copy-paste to trick installs. NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES anchors the
known-good scopes (@types, @reduxjs, @nestjs, …) so legitimate
installs stay silent.
Implementation:
- `scanners/lib/supply-chain-data.mjs`: exports POPULAR_NPM,
NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES, and `checkScopeHop(name, extraAllowedScopes)` —
pure function, no policy/network dependency, fully unit-testable.
- `knowledge/typosquat-allowlist.json`: mirrors NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES as
`npm_official_scopes`. A doc-consistency assertion ensures the two
lists never drift.
- `hooks/scripts/pre-install-supply-chain.mjs`: imports checkScopeHop,
reads `supply_chain.allowed_scopes` from policy, and pushes a
warning before existing compromised/audit checks.
Tests:
- 9 new cases in tests/hooks/pre-install-supply-chain.test.mjs:
TP @evilcorp/lodash, TP @attacker/express, allowlist @types,
allowlist @reduxjs, allowlist @modelcontextprotocol, FP unscoped
name not in top-100, bare unscoped name, policy override, defensive
non-string input, NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES <-> typosquat-allowlist.json
consistency.
Adds scanGitAttributes(repoDir) — pure function that parses
.gitattributes after a sandboxed clone and returns the
{filter,diff,merge} driver entries that would run on checkout. The
clone CLI prints each entry as a "MEDIUM" stderr advisory followed by
a recommendation to verify the smudge/clean command before moving the
clone outside the sandbox.
Why: filter drivers execute arbitrary shell during checkout (smudge
runs on read, clean on write). Even with the existing sandboxed clone,
downstream consumers that re-checkout files outside the sandbox can be
exploited. Surfacing the directive list lets the caller decide whether
to proceed.
Out-of-scope: in-line content of the smudge command is not analysed —
the advisory is for human review, not automatic blocking.
Tests:
- tests/lib/git-clone-gitattributes.test.mjs (8 cases): LFS-style,
custom driver, missing/empty/comment-only files, line-number
tracking, inline-comment stripping, unreadable path graceful return.
Adds rot13 to the variantSet built in scanForInjection(), so
imperative phrases hidden as rot13 inside code comments still hit
the existing CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM pattern arrays.
normalizeForScan() already covers base64, hex, URL, and HTML decoding
in a 3-iteration loop — those are NOT duplicated here. rot13 is the
only genuinely new variant: it is its own inverse and not part of any
NIST/Unicode normalization spec, so it has to be applied explicitly.
Threshold: only inputs >40 chars enter the rot13 pass, to suppress
false positives on accidental letter-shifts in tokens, ids, and short
identifiers. Variants are deduplicated against the existing set so
matchers do not run twice.
3 new tests in injection-patterns.test.mjs (rot13 detection, sub-40
char suppression, plaintext path still green). Total 168 tests pass.
Closes E3 in critical-review-2026-04-20.md.
Strips bash process substitution syntax — <(cmd) and >(cmd) — so the
inner command name is surfaced to downstream regex gates. Defeats
evasion like `cat <(curl evil)` where the destructive command is
hidden behind /dev/fd/N pipe sugar.
Implementation: bounded innermost-first iteration, depth 3. Beyond
that the string is left as-is rather than recurse without bound.
Runs after the single-quote mask phase, so legitimate strings like
`'echo <(x)'` are preserved.
5 new T7 tests (collapse + nested + FP probes) in
bash-normalize-t7-t9.test.mjs (now 12 tests total).
Closes E8 in critical-review-2026-04-20.md.
Defeats split-and-substitute evasion where attackers split a destructive
command name across an assignment and a variable reference (X=rm; later
$X) so downstream regex gates miss the literal command name. T9 collects
prefix assignments (VAR=value at start of string or after ; & |) and
substitutes ${VAR} / $VAR forms with the captured value. One-level
forward-flow only — chained vars are not followed.
Documented limits in JSDoc:
- Quoted assignments (X="rm -rf") not parsed (whitespace stops capture)
- Substitution is global within string, not scoped. Acceptable because
T3 strips unknown ${VAR} to '' afterwards.
Single-quoted literals are masked before T9 runs, so legitimate
strings are preserved (FP probe in tests).
7 new tests in bash-normalize-t7-t9.test.mjs.
Closes E10 in critical-review-2026-04-20.md.
The v7.0.0 entropy-scanner rule 18 suppressed every line whose pattern
matched  — regardless of the URL host or what the URL
carried. A markdown image URL pointing at a non-CDN host (or carrying a
secret-shaped token in its query string) would therefore mask a real
high-entropy credential.
Refactor:
* MARKDOWN_IMAGE now captures the full URL (was a host-only prefix
matcher), so rule 18 can inspect host and query.
* MARKDOWN_IMAGE_CDN_HOSTS allowlist constant covers cdn./images./
media./assets./static./*.cdn./*.amazonaws.com/{s3,cloudfront}/
*.cloudflare./*.fastly./*.akamaized./raw.githubusercontent.com/
*.imgix.net/*.cloudinary.com/.
* MARKDOWN_IMAGE_QUERY_SECRET catches secret-shaped query keys
(token, key, secret, password, api_key, access_token, auth) plus
well-known provider prefixes (AKIA, Bearer, sk_live_, ghp_, ghs_,
ghu_, gho_, ghr_, npm_).
* Rule 18 now suppresses iff (host matches CDN allowlist) AND
(query has no secret-shaped token). Anything else falls through
to entropy classification.
+4 tests in tests/scanners/entropy-context.test.mjs (29 → 33).
Existing rule 18 fixture (cdn.example.com, no secret query) still
suppresses, so no regression on the legitimate path.
Refs: Batch B Wave 5 / Step 13 / v7.2.0
critical-review-2026-04-20.md §E18
The v7.0.0 entropy-scanner ran rules 11-13 (GLSL/CSS-in-JS/inline-markup
line-proximity suppressions) for every line regardless of file type. A
polyglot `.ts` file with an embedded fragment-shader template literal
could therefore mask a real high-entropy credential when the credential
literal happened to share a line with a GLSL keyword. Critical-review
B5 documented the false-negative class.
Refactor:
* New `classifyFileContext(absPath, lines)` returns
`'shader-dominant' | 'markup-dominant' | 'code-dominant' | 'mixed'`,
keyed off file extension with a content-density fallback for
code-extension files (≥50% of sampled non-blank lines matching
GLSL/inline-markup → downgrade to `mixed`).
* `isFalsePositive(str, line, absPath, context)` gates rules 11-13
on `context !== 'code-dominant'`. Rules 1-10 and 14-19 still run
unconditionally, so URL/path/test-fixture/ffmpeg/UA/SQL/error-
template suppression behaves identically.
* `scanFileContent` computes `fileContext` once per file and threads
it through every per-string suppression check.
Conservative defaults to keep the regression surface minimal:
* Files with `<5` sampled non-blank lines fall back to `mixed`
(preserves the existing rule-11/12/13 behaviour for the single-
line .js fixtures used by entropy-context.test.mjs).
* Unknown extensions fall back to `mixed`.
* Code-extension files densely populated with shader/markup
content fall back to `mixed`.
Net effect: a `.ts` file with an embedded GLSL block but mostly TS
code on the surrounding lines now surfaces credentials that the
v7.0.0 line-proximity heuristic suppressed. Pure shader/markup
files are unaffected (extension skip / mixed default).
New fixture: tests/fixtures/entropy/polyglot-ts-with-glsl.ts (with
runtime placeholder so it does not commit a high-entropy literal).
+3 tests in tests/scanners/entropy-context.test.mjs (26 → 29).
Existing entropy.test.mjs and entropy-context.test.mjs all remain
green. Full suite 1658 → 1661.
Refs: Batch B Wave 5 / Step 12 / v7.2.0
critical-review-2026-04-20.md §B5
Two follow-up fixes after E16 + E17 landed:
1. foldHomoglyphs ASCII fast-path
- scanForInjection calls foldHomoglyphs on every scan (raw + normalized).
- Pre-fix: NFKC normalization runs unconditionally, even on pure
ASCII inputs where it's a no-op.
- Result: benchmark.test.mjs timed out at 120s on the full suite.
- Fix: charCodeAt sweep for >=128, short-circuit return s when
all ASCII. NFKC and HOMOGLYPH_MAP iteration only run when
non-ASCII chars are present (the actual attack case).
- Verified: benchmark.test.mjs passes within timeout.
2. Attack-scenario UNI-003 expectation
- Pre-E16: "Homoglyph Cyrillic-Latin mixing" payload triggered only
a MEDIUM "obfuscation present" advisory (exit 0, stdout match
"MEDIUM").
- Post-E16: the same payload is folded to Latin BEFORE pattern
matching, so it now matches CRITICAL "ignore previous instructions"
and blocks (exit 2).
- This is the intended v7.2.0 behavior — not a regression. Updated
expectation: exit_code 2, stdout_match "block". Renamed scenario
to "now blocked via E16 fold, v7.2.0".
Suite: pre-compact-scan flake remains (perf-budget under load,
passes isolated). All other tests green.
Critical-review §4 E16 finding: pre-v7.2.0 homoglyph normalization fired
ONLY for the MEDIUM-advisory "obfuscation present" signal. Pattern
matchers in scanForInjection compared against raw + decoded variants
only — they did NOT compare against a fold-normalized variant. As a
result, "ignоre previous instructions" (Cyrillic о, U+043E) bypassed
the CRITICAL "ignore previous" pattern.
Two coordinated edits:
scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs
- Adds HOMOGLYPH_MAP (frozen) — surgical Cyrillic/Greek → Latin map.
~25 entries focused on injection-vocabulary letters
(a, e, o, c, p, x, y, i, j, s, l, A, E, O, C, P, X, Y, T).
- Adds foldHomoglyphs(s) — pipeline: NFKC → apply HOMOGLYPH_MAP.
NFKC handles Mathematical Alphanumeric (U+1D400 block), fullwidth
Latin (U+FF21 block), ligatures, width variants.
Excluded by design from HOMOGLYPH_MAP:
- Latin Extended (æ, ø, å, é, è, ñ, ü, ö, ä, ç, ß, þ, ð) — legitimate
Norwegian/German/French/Spanish letters. Map them and we false-positive
on every non-English source file.
- Greek letters not visually overlapping (β, γ, δ, ...)
- Cyrillic letters not visually overlapping (б, г, д, ж, ...)
scanners/lib/injection-patterns.mjs
- scanForInjection now builds a 4-variant set: raw, normalized,
folded(raw), folded(normalized). Set deduplication skips redundant
identical variants. Existing dedup-by-label (seenLabels Set) prevents
double-counts when the same pattern matches in multiple variants.
- foldHomoglyphs added to the imports.
Tests: +27 cases in tests/lib/string-utils-homoglyph.test.mjs:
- 6 Cyrillic → Latin (lowercase, uppercase, multiple substitutions,
Palochka U+04CF)
- 3 Greek → Latin
- 2 NFKC normalization (Math Bold, Fullwidth)
- 8 preserves-non-confusable (Norwegian æøå, German umlauts, French
accents, Spanish ñ, emoji, CJK, Arabic/Hebrew)
- 3 edge cases (empty, null/undefined, idempotency)
- 5 scanForInjection integration (Cyrillic ignore, Cyrillic Assistant,
Norwegian non-trigger, benign "ignore" comment, mixed Cyrillic+Greek)
Test-development found: U+1D5DC is "I" not "A" (test pin caught my
codepoint mistake — fixed during dev).
Suite: 1617 → 1644 (+27). All green.
Critical-review §4 E1 finding: pre-v7.2.0 the Unicode-stego detector
(`containsUnicodeTags`) covered only U+E0001-E007F (Tag block). Private
Use Areas — also invisible in most terminals and surviving normalization
— were not detected. Attackers could encode payloads in PUA codepoints
that pass through `scanForInjection` undetected.
Coverage extended to:
- U+E0001-E007F Unicode Tag block (existing — DeepMind kat. 1)
- U+F0000-FFFFD Supplementary PUA-A (NEW — E1)
- U+100000-10FFFD Supplementary PUA-B (NEW — E1)
Detection-only for PUA: PUA characters have NO standard ASCII mapping,
so `decodeUnicodeTags` leaves them unchanged. Detection alone is
sufficient — `scanForInjection` emits HIGH on any presence, regardless
of decoded content.
Function name `containsUnicodeTags` preserved for back-compat. All
existing call sites (injection-patterns.mjs:259, etc.) work unchanged.
Semantically the function is now "containsHiddenUnicode".
Tests: +21 cases in tests/lib/string-utils-hidden-unicode.test.mjs:
- 5 Tag-block regression guards
- 4 PUA-A range cases (start, just-inside, end, buried-in-ASCII)
- 3 PUA-B range cases
- 5 boundary cases (gap U+E0080-EFFFF, U+10FFFE noncharacter, emoji,
CJK, Latin Extended — all must be FALSE)
- 4 decodeUnicodeTags passthrough cases (PUA-A unchanged, PUA-B
unchanged, Tag block still decodes, mixed Tag+PUA)
Suite: 1596 → 1617 (+21). All green.
Critical-review §4 E15 finding: agent files in .claude/agents/ are loaded
as Claude Code subagent system prompts and are a direct memory-poisoning
surface. Pre-v7.2.0 the scanner covered CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/*.md,
memory/*.md, REMEMBER.md, .local.md, and .claude-plugin/plugin.json —
but not .claude/agents/*.md.
Single-line addition to MEMORY_FILE_PATTERNS:
/(?:^|\/)\.claude\/agents\/[^/]+\.md$/
The existing scan loop, scanForInjection integration, and severity-
mapping logic all apply unchanged. STRICT_FILES_PATTERN intentionally
NOT extended — agents may legitimately quote shell commands as examples
(consistent with CLAUDE.md treatment).
Tests: +3 cases in tests/scanners/memory-poisoning.test.mjs:
- "scans .claude/agents/*.md" (smoke test — at least one finding from
the new fixture)
- "agent file injection pattern detected"
- "agent file credential path detected"
New fixture: tests/fixtures/memory-scan/poisoned-project/.claude/agents/
poisoned-agent.md — agent with injection, credential ref, permission
expansion, and exfil URL. Triggers all 4 detection categories.
Suite: 1591 → 1594 (+3). All green.
Critical-review §2 B7 finding: pure Levenshtein <=2 misses the most common
modern typosquat pattern — popular-name + token-injection suffix. Examples:
lodash → lodash-utils (edit distance 6, not flagged pre-B7)
react → react-helper (edit distance 7, not flagged pre-B7)
express → express-wrapper (edit distance 8, not flagged pre-B7)
Three coordinated edits:
scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs
- Adds tokenize(name): string[] splits on -/_, lowercases
- Adds tokenOverlap(a, b): number intersection.size / min(|a|,|b|)
- Adds TYPOSQUAT_SUSPICIOUS_TOKENS frozen list of common typosquat
suffixes. Excludes language-extension tokens (js, jsx, ts, tsx) — the
v7.0.0 allowlist contains `tsx` as a legit package and including the
same token in the suspicious set creates a contradiction. Caught by
the new allowlist-intersection-guard test. Also excludes 'pro'
(legitimate edition marker).
scanners/dep-auditor.mjs + scanners/supply-chain-recheck.mjs
- New checkTyposquatTokenOverlap() helper — fires AFTER Levenshtein 1/2
branches, only when:
1. popular package's tokens ⊆ declared name's tokens (strict superset)
2. declared name has at least one suspicious suffix
3. popular package is in topCutoff window
All three conditions required — conservative by design. Allowlist
precedence preserved (existing 22 npm + 13 PyPI entries always pass).
MEDIUM severity, NOT block. New finding title prefix:
"Possible typosquatting via token-overlap".
Tests: +21 cases across two new files
- tests/lib/string-utils-tokens.test.mjs (15) — tokenize, tokenOverlap,
TYPOSQUAT_SUSPICIOUS_TOKENS frozen contract, allowlist-intersection
guard (caught the tsx conflict on first run)
- tests/scanners/dep-token-overlap.test.mjs (7) — integration via
in-memory tmpdir fixtures: lodash-utils flagged, react-helper flagged,
express-wrapper flagged, lodash exact NOT flagged, allowlist tools
(knip/tsx/nx/rimraf) NOT flagged, react-router-dom (no suspicious
suffix) NOT flagged, react itself (equal token set, not superset)
NOT flagged.
Existing dep.test.mjs and supply-chain-recheck.test.mjs unchanged —
all green (149 → 149 regression guard).
Suite: 1570 → 1591 (+21). All green.
Critical-review §2 B6 finding: extractAssignedVariable handled
`const X = ...` and `X = ...` but missed every modern JS/TS
destructuring pattern. Sinks downstream of destructured/spread vars
produced false negatives at the propagation step.
Patterns now recognized:
- `const { x } = source` object destructuring
- `const { x, y } = source` multi-key
- `const { secret: alias } = source` renamed (key NOT bound)
- `const { x, ...spread } = source` object rest
- `const { a, b: { c } } = source` nested object (key NOT bound)
- `const [a, b] = source` array destructuring
- `const [first, ...rest] = source` array rest
- `const [a, [b, c]] = source` nested array
- `const { user: { id }, ...rest }` mixed nested
Implementation: regex-based two-pass walker. Pass 1 detects whether
the LHS is a destructuring pattern (`{...}` or `[...]`). If yes, the
new `extractDestructuredNames` helper walks the pattern body via a
balanced-bracket depth counter, recurses into nested patterns, and
distinguishes keys (`key:`) from bindings. If no, the plain-decl
branch matches `\b(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)`.
Plain-assignment branch (`X = ...` without keyword) and Python-style
patterns are unchanged.
The function is now exported for direct unit testing — same pattern
as `_resetCacheForTest` in policy-loader. The internal walker
(`extractDestructuredNames`) remains module-private.
Tests: +19 cases in tests/scanners/taint-destructuring.test.mjs:
- 5 pre-B6 patterns (regression guard: plain decl, plain assign,
no-match on equality)
- 12 destructuring patterns covering object/array/rest/nested
- 2 non-destructuring regressions (return literal, arrow param)
Existing taint-tracer.test.mjs and taint.test.mjs unchanged — both
green (14 → 14, fixture-based integration tests not affected).
Suite: 1551 → 1570 (+19). All green.
Critical-review §2 B3 finding: `riskScore({info: N}) = 0` silently masks
info-volume findings. The behavior was correct (info is scoring-inert by
design) but undocumented. Operators reading a report with N info findings
had no way to know they contribute zero to verdict/band.
Three coordinated edits:
- scanners/lib/severity.mjs JSDoc — explicit "Info severity" subsection
spelling out: scoring-inert, surfaced in owaspCategorize aggregates,
treat as observability telemetry not verdict input. @param updated to
mark info as accepted but ignored.
- CLAUDE.md v7.0.0 risk-score-v2 line — one-sentence anchor pointing to
severity.mjs JSDoc.
- tests/lib/severity.test.mjs — anchor test alongside the existing
4-critical=93 anchor: asserts riskScore({info: 50}) === 0,
riskScore({info: 1000}) === 0, verdict({info: 100}) === 'ALLOW',
riskBand(riskScore({info: 500})) === 'Low'.
Decision: skip the optional `infoScore()` helper from the brief. No
current consumer would use it; doc-only fix keeps API surface minimal.
Revisit if a consumer emerges.
Tests: 1522 → 1523 (+1 anchor block, 4 assertions). All green.
Closes A2 of v7.1.0 critical-review patch (docs/critical-review-2026-04-20.md):
- B4 (severity JSDoc): 4 critical = 93, not 90. Fixed in scanners/lib/severity.mjs:23
and CHANGELOG.md v7.0.0 tier description. The actual computation has always been
93 (70 + log2(5)*10 = 93.22 → round); only the docs were wrong.
- §5.4 co-monotonicity: new sweep test in tests/lib/severity.test.mjs over 15
representative count vectors. Asserts that (verdict, riskBand) agree under the
v7.0.0 contract for every case — catches future drift between riskScore tiers,
verdict cutoffs, and riskBand cutoffs. Includes a B4 anchor test (riskScore
{critical: 4} === 93) so doc/code drift fails loudly.
- B8 (CaMeL claims toned down): post-session-guard.mjs:646 comment block and
CLAUDE.md:184 Defense Philosophy bullet now describe the implementation
honestly — opportunistic byte-matching of truncated output fingerprints
(first 200 bytes, SHA-256/16-hex), not semantic data-flow tracking.
Trivially bypassed by mutation, summarisation, or re-encoding. Inspired by
CaMeL (DeepMind 2025), but not a CaMeL capability-tracking implementation.
Tests: 1495 → 1511 (+16: 15 sweep cases + 1 B4 anchor). All green.
E2E verification against content-heavy repo (`content-claude-code`) revealed
413 entropy findings (8 HIGH / 405 MEDIUM) from markdown image CDN URLs in
JSON content indexes — e.g., ``.
These are legitimate content-repo artifacts, not credentials. The 40-char
hash segment in the CDN URL trips Shannon entropy (H=5.29 over 300 chars),
and rule 13 (inline <svg>) doesn't match since there's no literal `<svg>`
tag — the `.svg` is just a URL path suffix.
Added rule 18 `MARKDOWN_IMAGE = /!\[[^\]]*\]\(\s*https?:\/\//` — matches
`` / ``. Line-level (not string-level) so URL
is not over-specific.
E2E impact on `content-claude-code`:
- Before: BLOCK / 65 / 8H 437M 0L
- After: WARNING / 56 / 3H 427M 0L
Hyperframes unchanged: BLOCK / 80 / 1C 4H 92M — real CRITICAL SQL-injection
and HIGH findings still detected.
Tests: 2 new (positive + negative fixture) bringing entropy-context to 26,
total suite 1485 → 1487.
Docs updated to "rules 11-18" and "8 new line-suppression rules".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final commit in the trustworthy-scoring series. Bundles verdict cutoff
alignment, the last suite of tests, and all documentation touch-points
that quote version numbers or describe v7.0.0 behaviour.
Verdict/band co-monotonicity
- `scanners/lib/severity.mjs` — verdict cutoffs moved from 61/21 to 65/15
so `BLOCK >= 65`, `WARNING >= 15` locks onto the v2 riskBand() boundaries.
Prevents "BLOCK / Medium band" contradictions under the v2 formula.
Scanner hardening (bug fixes from v7.0.0 testing)
- `scanners/entropy-scanner.mjs` — `policy_source` now uses
`existsSync('.llm-security/policy.json')` instead of value-based check.
Old heuristic always reported 'policy.json' because DEFAULT_POLICY now
carries an `entropy.thresholds` section.
- `scanners/lib/file-discovery.mjs` — `.sass` and GPU shader extensions
(`.glsl, .frag, .vert, .shader, .wgsl`) added to TEXT_EXTENSIONS. Without
this, shader files were invisible to file-discovery, so they were never
counted as skipped by the entropy-scanner extension filter.
Tests
- `tests/scanners/entropy-context.test.mjs` (new, 24 tests) — A. File-ext
skip (4), B. Line-level rules 11-17 (8), C. Policy overrides (3).
Fixtures generate 80-char base64 payloads at runtime via
`crypto.randomBytes` to dodge the plugin's own pre-edit credential hook
on the test source.
- `tests/lib/severity.test.mjs` — rewritten with v2 scoring table (70
tests total, was 52).
- `tests/lib/output.test.mjs:243` — "1 critical = score 80" under v2
(was 25 under v1).
- Full suite: 1485/1485 green (was 1461).
Docs
- `CHANGELOG.md` — v7.0.0 entry with BREAKING CHANGES section.
- `README.md` (plugin + marketplace root) — version badge, history table,
plugin-card version string, test count.
- `CLAUDE.md` — header version, "v7.0.0 — Trustworthy scoring" summary
paragraph at the top.
- `docs/security-hardening-guide.md` — new section 6 "Calibration & false
positives" documenting v2 formula, context-aware entropy scanner,
typosquat allowlist, and §6.4 tuning workflow. Existing "Recommended
baseline" section renumbered to §7.
Version bump
- `6.6.0 -> 7.0.0` across package.json, .claude-plugin/plugin.json,
scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs VERSION const, README badge,
CLAUDE.md header, marketplace root README card.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds entropy section to DEFAULT_POLICY and wires it into entropy-scanner.
Users can now tune false-positive tradeoffs without forking the scanner.
Policy shape (.llm-security/policy.json):
entropy:
thresholds.{critical,high,medium}.{entropy,minLen} — numeric overrides
suppress_extensions[] — additive ext skip
suppress_line_patterns[] — additional regex
suppress_paths[] — relPath substrings
Wiring: entropy-scanner calls loadPolicy(targetPath) at scan entry (not
orchestrator-passed — avoids signature churn across 10 scanners). Module-
level state is reset per scan invocation. Scanner envelope now includes
calibration.{policy_source, thresholds, files_skipped_by_*} for
synthesizer transparency (Commit 5).
Malformed user regex silently skipped. Missing policy.json → built-in
defaults (backwards-compatible).
entropy.test.mjs: 9/9 still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Observed 70% false-positive rate on renderer/shader codebases (hyperframes):
GLSL, CSS-in-JS, inline HTML/SVG, ffmpeg filter-strings, hardcoded
User-Agent strings all matched base64-like entropy thresholds. This
commit adds two suppression layers before classification.
Layer A — file-extension skip: .glsl/.frag/.vert/.shader/.wgsl (shaders),
.css/.scss/.sass/.less (stylesheets), .svg (markup), .min.js/.min.css
(minified bundles). Tracked via new calibration.files_skipped_by_extension
field on scanner envelope for synthesizer stats.
Layer B — seven new line-level suppression rules in isFalsePositive()
(rules 11-17): GLSL/WGSL keywords, CSS-in-JS (styled/emotion/@keyframes),
inline HTML/SVG markup, ffmpeg filter-graph syntax, browser User-Agent,
SQL DDL/DML, error-message templates with embedded HTML.
Existing entropy.test.mjs: 9/9 still green — known bad base64 payload in
telemetry.mjs fixture still detected. Policy-driven thresholds wired in
Commit 3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace sum-and-cap formula (every non-trivial scan → 100/Extreme) with
severity-dominated, log-scaled-within-tier model. Discriminates actual
risk: 1 critical = 80, 2 critical = 86, 17 high = 65. Hyperframes-class
rendering codebases no longer collapse to Extreme just from shader noise.
Changes:
- scanners/lib/severity.mjs: new riskScore() v2; keep riskScoreV1() for
reference; riskBand() cutoffs aligned (14/39/64/84).
- scanners/posture-scanner.mjs: delete inline duplicate formula, import
riskScore/riskBand/verdict from severity.mjs. Single source of truth.
Breaking: aggregate.risk_score semantics change. Batched with entropy
suppression (Commit 2+) under v7.0.0 bump in Commit 6. Do not release
individually — JSON consumers depend on scoring band stability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Symmetric with the existing VS Code branch — the env var was only wired
into getVSCodeExtensionRoots(), so the plan's master verification
(`LLM_SECURITY_IDE_ROOTS=... --intellij-only`) reported 0 discovered
plugins. Adding the same fallback to discoverJetBrainsExtensions makes
both families honor the CLI override and closes the gap.
Step 1/17 of ultraplan-2026-04-17-jetbrains-ide-scan.
- Populate top-jetbrains-plugins.json with 56 canonical xmlIds (bundled +
popular third-party): com.intellij.java, org.jetbrains.kotlin,
com.jetbrains.python.community, org.rust.lang, com.github.copilot,
mobi.hsz.idea.gitignore, the legitimate-typo 'Lombook Plugin', etc.
- Add loadJetBrainsBlocklist() export mirroring loadVSCodeBlocklist shape.
Blocklist is empty by design — no public confirmed-malicious JetBrains
Marketplace plugins as of 2026-04-17.
- Add tests/scanners/ide-extension-data.test.mjs (9 tests, all pass).
- Fix cache bug in loadTopJetBrains: map normalizeId on cache-hit path too
(was previously unnormalized on second call).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
VSIX fetch + extract for URL targets now runs in a sub-process wrapped by
sandbox-exec (macOS) or bwrap (Linux), reusing the same primitives proven
by the v5.1 git-clone sandbox. Defense-in-depth — even if our own
zip-extract.mjs ever has a bypass, the kernel refuses any write outside
the per-scan temp directory.
New files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch-worker.mjs — sub-process worker. Argv: --url
--tmpdir; emits one JSON line on stdout (ok/sha256/size/source/extRoot
or ok:false/error/code). Silent on stderr. Exit 0/1.
- scanners/lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs — wrapper. Exports buildSandboxProfile,
buildBwrapArgs, buildSandboxedWorker, runVsixWorker. 35s timeout, 1 MB
stdout cap.
Changes:
- scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs: fetchAndExtractVsixUrl is now
sandbox-aware (useSandbox option, default true). In-process logic
preserved as fallback. New meta.source.sandbox field:
'sandbox-exec' | 'bwrap' | 'none' | 'in-process'.
- scan(target, { useSandbox }) defaults to true; tests pass false because
globalThis.fetch mocks do not cross process boundaries.
- Windows fallback: in-process with meta.warnings advisory.
Tests:
- 8 new tests in tests/scanners/vsix-sandbox.test.mjs (per-platform
profile generation, worker arg construction, live worker exit
behavior on invalid URLs — no network).
- Existing URL tests updated to opt out of sandbox (useSandbox: false).
- 1344 → 1352 tests, all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-installation verification of VS Code extensions via URL — fetch a remote
VSIX, extract it in a hardened sandbox, and run the existing IDE scanner
pipeline against it. No npm dependencies.
Sources:
- VS Code Marketplace (publisher.gallery.vsassets.io direct download)
- OpenVSX (open-vsx.org official API)
- Direct .vsix HTTPS URLs
Defenses:
- HTTPS-only, TLS verified, manual redirect with per-source host whitelist
- 30s total timeout via AbortController
- 50MB compressed cap, 500MB uncompressed, 100x expansion ratio
- Zero-dep ZIP extractor: zip-slip, absolute paths, drive letters, NUL bytes,
symlinks (Unix mode 0xA000), depth limits, ZIP64 rejected, encrypted rejected
- SHA-256 streamed during fetch, surfaced in meta.source
- Temp dir cleanup in all paths (try/finally)
Files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch.mjs (HTTPS fetcher, host whitelist, streaming SHA-256)
- scanners/lib/zip-extract.mjs (zero-dep parser with hardening caps)
- knowledge/marketplace-api-notes.md (endpoint reference)
- 3 test files (48 tests added: vsix-fetch, zip-extract, ide-extension-url)
Tests: 1296 → 1344 (all green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Masks non-empty '...' content before T5/T2-T4 run so literal strings such
as `echo '${IFS}'` are not rewritten. Empty '' pairs are stripped first
so c''u''rl -> curl evasion keeps resolving. ANSI-C $'...' is decoded
before masking.
Caught by the false-positive probe added in Step 3 of ultraplan-v6.2.0.
Add threshold-based exit codes (--fail-on <severity>) and compact
output mode (--compact) to scan-orchestrator and CLI. Pipeline
templates for GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF
upload. CI/CD guide with Schrems II/NSM compliance documentation.
npm publish preparation (files whitelist, .npmignore). Policy ci
section for distributable CI defaults. Version 6.1.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
process.exit() terminates before pipe buffers drain, truncating output
at 64KB when piped through another Node.js process on macOS. Affects
scan-orchestrator (SARIF output) and supply-chain-recheck-cli.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New policy-loader.mjs reads .llm-security/policy.json with deep-merge against
defaults that exactly match existing hardcoded values. Integrated into all 7 hooks:
- pre-prompt-inject-scan: injection.mode (env var still takes precedence)
- post-session-guard: trifecta.mode, window_size, long_horizon_window
- pre-edit-secrets: secrets.additional_patterns
- pre-bash-destructive: destructive.additional_blocked
- pre-write-pathguard: pathguard.additional_protected
- pre-install-supply-chain: supply_chain.additional_blocked_packages
- post-mcp-verify: mcp.volume_threshold_bytes, mcp.trusted_servers
Backward compatible: no policy file = identical behavior to v5.1.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New audit-trail.mjs writes structured events to LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG path.
Integrated into post-session-guard at 6 warning emission points: trifecta,
escalation-after-input, data flow, volume threshold, slow-burn, behavioral drift.
No-op when env var not set — zero overhead for existing users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
