npx llm-security requires npm publishing which hasn't happened.
Updated 3 references to use node bin/llm-security.mjs which works today.
CI templates and docs intentionally kept as-is (designed for future npm).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Badges, intro, commands, scanner table, Mermaid diagram, directory tree,
and knowledge base section all had counts frozen at v3-v4 era. Updated
to match actual filesystem: 21 scanners (10+11), 18 commands, 16 knowledge
files, 16 posture categories, 1264 tests. Added missing bin/, ci/, docs/
directories and all standalone scanners to directory tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add threshold-based exit codes (--fail-on <severity>) and compact
output mode (--compact) to scan-orchestrator and CLI. Pipeline
templates for GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF
upload. CI/CD guide with Schrems II/NSM compliance documentation.
npm publish preparation (files whitelist, .npmignore). Policy ci
section for distributable CI defaults. Version 6.1.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
process.exit() terminates before pipe buffers drain, truncating output
at 64KB when piped through another Node.js process on macOS. Affects
scan-orchestrator (SARIF output) and supply-chain-recheck-cli.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New policy-loader.mjs reads .llm-security/policy.json with deep-merge against
defaults that exactly match existing hardcoded values. Integrated into all 7 hooks:
- pre-prompt-inject-scan: injection.mode (env var still takes precedence)
- post-session-guard: trifecta.mode, window_size, long_horizon_window
- pre-edit-secrets: secrets.additional_patterns
- pre-bash-destructive: destructive.additional_blocked
- pre-write-pathguard: pathguard.additional_protected
- pre-install-supply-chain: supply_chain.additional_blocked_packages
- post-mcp-verify: mcp.volume_threshold_bytes, mcp.trusted_servers
Backward compatible: no policy file = identical behavior to v5.1.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New audit-trail.mjs writes structured events to LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG path.
Integrated into post-session-guard at 6 warning emission points: trifecta,
escalation-after-input, data flow, volume threshold, slow-burn, behavioral drift.
No-op when env var not set — zero overhead for existing users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New sarif-formatter.mjs converts scan envelope to OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 standard.
Maps severity to SARIF levels, findings to results with locations and rules.
scan-orchestrator accepts --format sarif|json (default: json).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends posture scanner from 13 to 16 categories with three governance/compliance
checks. New categories are advisory (not in CRITICAL_CATEGORIES) — existing Grade A
projects remain Grade A. VERSION bumped to 6.0.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All 6 plugin READMEs now use identical installation section:
marketplace-first approach with /plugin browsing, then direct
settings.json as alternative. Replaces inconsistent mix of
git clone, plugin add, and JSON-only instructions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Initial addition of ms-ai-architect plugin to the open-source marketplace.
Private content excluded: orchestrator/ (Linear tooling), docs/utredning/
(client investigation), generated test reports and PDF export script.
skill-gen tooling moved from orchestrator/ to scripts/skill-gen/.
Security scan: WARNING (risk 20/100) — no secrets, no injection found.
False positive fixed: added gitleaks:allow to Python variable reference
in output-validation-grounding-verification.md line 109.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add detailed platform matrix with links to sandbox-exec, bubblewrap,
Windows Sandbox, Docker Desktop, WSL2, and AppContainer documentation.
CVE reference for .gitattributes attack vector. Git config flag table
with per-flag mitigation descriptions. Windows guidance with concrete
options and recommendations. Note on why Node.js --permission is not
applicable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Harden git clone attack surface for remote scans with defense-in-depth:
Layer 1 (all platforms): 8 git config flags disable hooks, symlinks,
filter/smudge drivers, fsmonitor, local file protocol. 4 env vars
isolate from system/user git config and block interactive prompts.
Layer 2 (OS sandbox): macOS sandbox-exec and Linux bubblewrap (bwrap)
restrict file writes to only the specific temp directory. bwrap
probe-tests availability before use. Graceful fallback on Windows
and Ubuntu 24.04+ (git config hardening only).
Additional: post-clone 100MB size check, UUID-unique evidence filenames,
evidence file cleanup, cleanup guarantee in scan/plugin-audit commands.
32 new tests (1147 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
