Shared OKF (Open Knowledge Format) ingestion library: spec-based connectors, bundle inbox, and external-bundle import. Security delegated to llm-ingestion-guard.
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Kjell Tore Guttormsen f7385fafdb docs(okf-v0.2): the pilot answered before the tag existed, and it changed the tag
All three pilots accepted. Their measurements land in the plan now rather than
as failed runs later, which is the entire return on asking before building.

Six corrections, each measured by the consumer rather than reasoned by us:

- A-E6 specified `okf_version: "0.2"` quoted. Catalog measured the quoted form
  failing their shape regex with exit 1, and a UTF-8 BOM making the marker
  invisible while still exiting 0. Both now stated as raw-byte expectations.
- A-E2 said the diff lies only *inside* the frontmatter block. No bundle whose
  root index has no frontmatter block can satisfy that together with A-E6.
- B-E3 covers one of catalog's three gates; the other two cannot see our
  fixture. Recorded so the report is not read as broader than it is.
- Our claim that no gate keys on the version value was wrong as formulated:
  check-okf-parity.mjs puts the raw value in its signature. It compares without
  judging -- verdict-invariant, not value-blind.
- C-E1's ground truth is 524 non-reserved documents, not 522; 522 was correct
  at d2c12d2.
- `materialize_bundle` gains keyword-only `profile=DEFAULT` on po-claude's
  request. The signature already has a `*`, so their three-positional call path
  stays source-compatible and additivity becomes a property of the signature
  instead of something a consumer measures.

Also recorded: po-claude closed their index-parser defect themselves (f41264f),
so do not design around it; the assumption under it -- "a generated index has no
frontmatter" -- is not peculiar to them. Dropping the superseded `timestamp`
draws one catalog warning per concept file, decided after the pilot, not before.

The estimate's open caveat is discharged by reading profiles.py:197: emit is one
formatting path, the validator already admits list values, so only the emitter
side is missing and the sizing stands.

CLAUDE.md gains a standing constraint: consumer content stays at form level in
public files. The wiki's bundle is private pending an Anthropic ToS assessment,
their report goes back through coord, and a push is not reversible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2aKJxLejT9S8jYwoZ9fut
2026-07-26 17:03:05 +02:00
docs docs(okf-v0.2): the pilot answered before the tag existed, and it changed the tag 2026-07-26 17:03:05 +02:00
examples feat(examples): ship the §11 golden fixtures with byte-exact conformance 2026-07-16 20:09:03 +02:00
src/llm_ingestion_okf feat(phase-3): the index policy becomes configurable, with the reader that judges it 2026-07-25 20:30:54 +02:00
tests feat(phase-3): the index policy becomes configurable, with the reader that judges it 2026-07-25 20:30:54 +02:00
.gitignore feat: initial commit — repo scaffold and v1 scope 2026-07-16 10:12:59 +02:00
CHANGELOG.md docs: two corrections from the convention owner and the spec owner 2026-07-25 12:32:21 +02:00
CLAUDE.md docs(okf-v0.2): the pilot answered before the tag existed, and it changed the tag 2026-07-26 17:03:05 +02:00
LICENSE feat: initial commit — repo scaffold and v1 scope 2026-07-16 10:12:59 +02:00
pyproject.toml docs(install): correct how the guard reaches a consumer, measured both ways 2026-07-25 12:24:54 +02:00
README.md feat(phase-3): the index policy becomes configurable, with the reader that judges it 2026-07-25 20:30:54 +02:00
uv.lock chore(release): v0.4.0 2026-07-25 12:08:48 +02:00

llm-ingestion-okf

Shared ingestion library for OKF (Open Knowledge Format) bundles.

Status: phases 1 and 2 are implemented. Phase 1 (spec-based ingestion) covers manifest validation, the file/sql/http connectors, deterministic materialization, index generation, and the golden fixture suite under examples/. Phase 2 adds the bundle inbox (process_inbox) and external-bundle import (import_bundle), both against an injected persist gate, with llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter wiring that gate to the real guard (see below). One phase-2 item is deliberately outstanding: binary extraction (pdf/docx/xlsx behind the [extract] extra) is unimplemented, so those types are rejected fail-fast. Phases 34 are planned (see docs/plan/).

Planned scope (v1)

The library provides three entry points for getting content into an OKF bundle:

  1. Spec-based ingestion. An implementation of the normative ingest specification owned by portfolio-optimiser-commons: manifest → file/sql/http connector → deterministic materialization of ingest-{id}.md concept files → index generation. Zero model calls in the run path; output is reproducible byte-for-byte against golden fixtures.
  2. Bundle inbox. A drop directory where common file types are converted to OKF concept files. All file-type→text extraction lives in this library: md, txt, csv, json, and html are handled by the stdlib core; pdf, docx, and xlsx require the optional [extract] extra and are rejected fail-fast without it. Extracted text passes the security gate before anything is persisted.
  3. External bundle import. Import and merge of third-party OKF bundles: each concept is assessed via the security gate, and only concepts that pass are merged, materialized, and linked into the index.

Boundary: security is delegated

Security is owned by the sibling package llm-ingestion-guard (pinned >=0.2,<0.3). The division is strict:

  • guard answers "is this content safe to persist?" — scan, sanitize, quarantine, fail-secure, provenance stamping.
  • this library does the plumbing — connect a source, materialize a deterministic OKF bundle, generate the index.

No security functionality is reimplemented here.

What is gated today: read this before trusting a door

  • Door A (materialize_bundle) is ungated. It calls nothing before writing to disk and writes what it is given. A caller materializing untrusted content is responsible for gating it.
  • Doors B and C (process_inbox, import_bundle) gate through an adapter you pass in. Each takes a gate argument; the flow hands it the content and obeys the verdict, refusing to persist anything that does not clear the guard's non-blocking floor — including a disposition it does not recognise, and (at Door C) a concept the gate returned no verdict for. What it cannot do is check that your adapter is a real guard: a permissive stub approves everything, and the flow will believe it.

llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter is the adapter over the real guard, and the only module here that imports it — importing the package itself does not:

from llm_ingestion_okf import process_inbox
from llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter import inbox_gate

result = process_inbox(inbox_dir, bundle_dir, "2026-07-25T12:00:00Z",
                       okf_type="reference", gate=inbox_gate)

Two properties of that adapter are worth knowing before you rely on it. It screens the exact bytes it persists — the guard's prepare_input bookend prepares text for a model call, which this library never makes, so only screen_output is used and the screened string is the written string. And it refuses rather than repairs: a file carrying an invisible zero-width or bidi character is rejected, not silently stripped and written. Door B screens under the untrusted-upload policy, so any finding at all is held back rather than persisted.

This section is stated plainly because earlier wording ("calls the guard at every persist gate") described the intended end state in the present tense, and a consumer reasonably read it as safe-by-default.

Roadmap

The library is built in four phases so that every known OKF surface in the ecosystem is eventually covered. Each phase has a detailed plan with verification criteria:

  1. Spec-based ingestion (Python) with byte-exact golden fixtures — plan.
  2. Bundle inbox and external-bundle import (Python), guard-gated — plan.
  3. Configurable bundle contract (types, layers, frontmatter sets, index shape, and reserved-file policy as configuration), enabling stricter bundle profiles such as strict-v1plan.
  4. A node/ half: a zero-dependency Node/ESM package (importable and CLI-invokable, vendored per consumer) providing bundle checking, index generation, inbox processing, and document conversion for the OKF second-brain plugin ecosystem. The Python and Node halves share the OKF contract and fixture suite, not code — plan.

Non-goals

  • Verdict/feedback machinery from the method specification (stays in the consuming repositories).
  • Embedding- or retrieval-layer functionality.
  • Security functionality, in either runtime — that is always llm-ingestion-guard's domain.

Requirements

Python 3.10+, and exactly one runtime dependency — the security boundary, llm-ingestion-guard>=0.2,<0.3. Everything else is stdlib.

That guard is not on a package index yet, so with pip, install it first — otherwise installing this package fails with No matching distribution found for llm-ingestion-guard:

pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v0.2.0"
pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-okf.git@v0.4.0"

With uv, one command is enough — uv pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+…@v0.4.0" resolves the guard from the tag on its own, because uv reads the [tool.uv.sources] entry in this project's pyproject.toml when it builds from the source tree. Both paths were measured on 2026-07-25.

A git URL is a PEP 508 direct reference and pins one exact tag, so it is an install-time channel, not the pin: the range above stays the declared dependency — the built wheel carries Requires-Dist: llm-ingestion-guard<0.3,>=0.2 — and resolves normally once the package index exists. The optional [extract] extra (pdf/docx/xlsx parsers) is not populated yet. The planned Node half targets Node/ESM with zero npm dependencies.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.