A conformance fixture has to name a finding. The two runtimes that seed this repository do not name the same pattern the same way -- llm-security says "override: ignore previous instructions", the guard says "override:ignore-previous" -- so until now no expected.json could be written at all, including for the 64 patterns whose regex is byte-identical in both. Each pattern now carries `id` plus an `aliases` object naming what each seeding runtime calls it, and a top-level pattern_id_space block explains the field, its provenance and its stability contract. The id is adopted verbatim from the guard's port rather than invented here: that port already carries both names, so the mapping is read from source data. Matched by label <-> desc with em-dash normalised to hyphen, 83/83 one-to-one, 83 unique ids. No detection data moved, and that is proven rather than asserted: labels, patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence, no flags key was invented (78 before, 78 after), and stripping id + aliases + pattern_id_space reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte -- 23566 bytes. All 83 patterns still compile in Node bare and under u (166/166) and in Python re (83/83). Neither consumer has ratified this id space; both were asked by coord today, and the file records it as a proposal rather than implying agreement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FaYqid3mejFmd9ZHsiHgp3
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Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.
Versioning note: the repository tag versions the contract (file set, key names,
case ids, disposition semantics). Each JSON file additionally carries its own
"version" field, bumped when that file changes.
[Unreleased]
Initial extraction, in progress. Runtime-neutral detection data and the finding contract,
extracted from the llm-security Node implementation and a Python guard without behaviour
change. Not yet tagged — see Not included below.
Added
schema/finding.schema.json— the finding contract plus the SARIF output profile. Normative. The JSONL profile is deliberately leftunspecified.signatures/active-content.json— the EchoLeak class (CVE-2025-32711): 17 patterns, severities, opacity floors and pass order, from the Python guard.lexicon/injection-lexicon.json— 83 prompt-injection patterns in four families (21 critical, 32 high, 22 medium, 8 hybrid).codepoints/carriers.json— six carrier tables: zero-width characters, the Unicode Tags block, the Supplementary Private Use Areas, BIDI controls, the Cyrillic presence set and the 28-entry fold-to-Latin homoglyph map.signatures/secret-egress.json— the 18 fixed credential and token shapes. Array order is normative.mapping/owasp-map.json— four taxonomy maps (LLM, ASI, AST, MCP) over one shared 16-prefix key set.calibration/calibration.json— risk-score tier constants, verdict thresholds, risk-band cutoffs, posture grade thresholds.
Verification
Every file above except calibration.json was proven rather than transcribed: the data was
rebuilt from the commons JSON alone and diffed against the source implementation. Each
file records its own result and its own limits.
calibration/calibration.json carries verified: false. Its source arrived as a prose
summary rather than as code, so no differential check was possible, and the file names the
checks that were not run instead of attaching a caveat to a pass.
docs/lexicon-port-divergence.md— informative. A differential comparison of the two ports ofinjection-patterns.mjs(this repository's and the Python guard's): 83/83 patterns correspond, 64 are byte-identical, 6 differ only by escaping and are proven equivalent, and 13 behave differently, with a witness input for each and misses on both sides. The cause is two different ReDoS mitigations of one table. No data file was changed — behaviour preservation holds and the finding is reported to the owning repositories.
Changed
-
lexicon/injection-lexicon.json0.1.0 → 0.2.0 — every pattern gains a commons-ownedidand analiasesobject naming what each seeding runtime calls it, plus a top-levelpattern_id_spaceblock explaining the field. This exists because aconformance/fixture has to name a finding and the two runtimes do not name the same pattern the same way.The id was adopted verbatim from the guard's port, which already carried both names, rather than invented here. Matching was by
label↔descwith em-dash normalised to hyphen: 83/83, one-to-one, ids unique.No detection data moved. Labels, patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence, no
flagskey was invented (78 before, 78 after), and stripping the three new fields reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte — 23 566 bytes, identical. All 83 patterns still compile in Node bare and underu(166/166) and in Pythonre(83/83).Neither
llm-securitynor the guard has ratified this id space yet; both were asked by coord on 2026-08-09, and the file says so rather than implying agreement.
Not included
signatures/malware-signatures.json— seed data not yet delivered.spec/decode-pipeline.md— needs the decode implementation. A normative spec inferred from a data dump would be worse than an absent one.conformance/— still absent, with half the blocker cleared. 105 of the guard's 134 coverage cases are convertible to staticinput.txt/expected.json; the other 29 assert a runtime's API surface, which this repository does not own. Findings can now be named (seepattern_id_spaceabove), but 13 patterns still have no agreed expected behaviour — the two ports genuinely differ on them — so those fixtures cannot be authored until the owning repositories answer.
These are named in the README as planned rather than linked, so nothing in the repository points at a file that does not exist.