llm-security-commons/CHANGELOG.md
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 7b70f5b52f feat(lexicon): publish a commons-owned pattern id with per-runtime aliases
A conformance fixture has to name a finding. The two runtimes that seed this
repository do not name the same pattern the same way -- llm-security says
"override: ignore previous instructions", the guard says
"override:ignore-previous" -- so until now no expected.json could be written
at all, including for the 64 patterns whose regex is byte-identical in both.

Each pattern now carries `id` plus an `aliases` object naming what each
seeding runtime calls it, and a top-level pattern_id_space block explains the
field, its provenance and its stability contract.

The id is adopted verbatim from the guard's port rather than invented here:
that port already carries both names, so the mapping is read from source data.
Matched by label <-> desc with em-dash normalised to hyphen, 83/83 one-to-one,
83 unique ids.

No detection data moved, and that is proven rather than asserted: labels,
patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence, no flags key was invented
(78 before, 78 after), and stripping id + aliases + pattern_id_space
reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte -- 23566 bytes. All 83
patterns still compile in Node bare and under u (166/166) and in Python re
(83/83).

Neither consumer has ratified this id space; both were asked by coord today,
and the file records it as a proposal rather than implying agreement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FaYqid3mejFmd9ZHsiHgp3
2026-08-09 21:46:48 +02:00

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# Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this
project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
Versioning note: the repository tag versions **the contract** (file set, key names,
case ids, disposition semantics). Each JSON file additionally carries its own
`"version"` field, bumped when that file changes.
## [Unreleased]
Initial extraction, in progress. Runtime-neutral detection data and the finding contract,
extracted from the `llm-security` Node implementation and a Python guard without behaviour
change. **Not yet tagged** — see *Not included* below.
### Added
- `schema/finding.schema.json` — the finding contract plus the SARIF output profile.
Normative. The JSONL profile is deliberately left `unspecified`.
- `signatures/active-content.json` — the EchoLeak class (CVE-2025-32711): 17 patterns,
severities, opacity floors and pass order, from the Python guard.
- `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` — 83 prompt-injection patterns in four families
(21 critical, 32 high, 22 medium, 8 hybrid).
- `codepoints/carriers.json` — six carrier tables: zero-width characters, the Unicode Tags
block, the Supplementary Private Use Areas, BIDI controls, the Cyrillic presence set and
the 28-entry fold-to-Latin homoglyph map.
- `signatures/secret-egress.json` — the 18 fixed credential and token shapes. Array order
is normative.
- `mapping/owasp-map.json` — four taxonomy maps (LLM, ASI, AST, MCP) over one shared
16-prefix key set.
- `calibration/calibration.json` — risk-score tier constants, verdict thresholds, risk-band
cutoffs, posture grade thresholds.
### Verification
Every file above except `calibration.json` was proven rather than transcribed: the data was
rebuilt **from the commons JSON alone** and diffed against the source implementation. Each
file records its own result and its own limits.
`calibration/calibration.json` carries `verified: false`. Its source arrived as a prose
summary rather than as code, so no differential check was possible, and the file names the
checks that were not run instead of attaching a caveat to a pass.
- `docs/lexicon-port-divergence.md` — informative. A differential comparison of the two
ports of `injection-patterns.mjs` (this repository's and the Python guard's): 83/83
patterns correspond, 64 are byte-identical, 6 differ only by escaping and are proven
equivalent, and **13 behave differently**, with a witness input for each and misses on
both sides. The cause is two different ReDoS mitigations of one table. **No data file was
changed** — behaviour preservation holds and the finding is reported to the owning
repositories.
### Changed
- `lexicon/injection-lexicon.json` **0.1.0 → 0.2.0** — every pattern gains a commons-owned
`id` and an `aliases` object naming what each seeding runtime calls it, plus a top-level
`pattern_id_space` block explaining the field. This exists because a `conformance/`
fixture has to name a finding and the two runtimes do not name the same pattern the same
way.
The id was **adopted verbatim from the guard's port**, which already carried both names,
rather than invented here. Matching was by `label``desc` with em-dash normalised to
hyphen: 83/83, one-to-one, ids unique.
**No detection data moved.** Labels, patterns and flags are byte-identical in sequence,
no `flags` key was invented (78 before, 78 after), and stripping the three new fields
reproduces the previous committed file byte for byte — 23 566 bytes, identical. All 83
patterns still compile in Node bare and under `u` (166/166) and in Python `re` (83/83).
Neither `llm-security` nor the guard has ratified this id space yet; both were asked by
coord on 2026-08-09, and the file says so rather than implying agreement.
### Not included
- `signatures/malware-signatures.json` — seed data not yet delivered.
- `spec/decode-pipeline.md` — needs the decode implementation. A normative spec inferred
from a data dump would be worse than an absent one.
- `conformance/` — still absent, with half the blocker cleared. 105 of the guard's 134
coverage cases are convertible to static `input.txt`/`expected.json`; the other 29 assert
a runtime's API surface, which this repository does not own. Findings can now be **named**
(see `pattern_id_space` above), but 13 patterns still have no agreed **expected
behaviour** — the two ports genuinely differ on them — so those fixtures cannot be
authored until the owning repositories answer.
These are named in the README as planned rather than linked, so nothing in the repository
points at a file that does not exist.